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Abstract
Implementing Privacy-Preserving Filters in the MOA
Stream Mining Framework
by David Mart´ınez Rodr´ıguez
Data mining enables a better understanding of human and natural processes by analyzing
massive amounts of data with machine learning algorithms. Stream mining is a process
that allows us to discover knowledge in data when it comes in the form of a continuous
stream. MOA, initials for Massive Online Analysis, is an open source data stream mining
framework, developed at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. One of the available
features in MOA is the use of filters, which can process streaming data before or after
being fed to other subsystems, such as machine learning algorithms.
Although data science has brought us many benefits, because the data being analyzed
is often personal and sensitive, we face the threat of losing our privacy. Statistical Dis-
closure Control (SDC) deals with controlling that information about specific individuals
is not extracted from released datasets, whilst maintaining the statistical significance of
the masked data. By applying SDC techniques to data, disclosure is prevented, thus
effectively protecting the privacy of the data owners.
Four MOA privacy-preserving filters have been developed in this project, which im-
plement the following SDC methods: noise addition, microaggregation, data rank
swapping and differentially private microaggregation. Each of the algorithms has
been adapted from well-known solutions in order to enable their utilization for stream
processing tasks. Finally, the filters have been benchmarked to assess their quality in
terms of two important SDC measurments: disclosure risk and information loss.
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Resum
Implementing Privacy-Preserving Filters in the MOA
Stream Mining Framework
per David Mart´ınez Rodr´ıguez
La mineria de dades ens ajuda a entendre millor els processos antropoge`nics i nat-
urals, analitzant quantitats massives de dades, mitjanc¸ant algorismes d’aprenentatge
automa`tic. La mineria de fluxos de dades e´s un paradigma d’ana`lisi que ens permet
extreure coneixement de les dades quan so´n rebudes en forma d’un flux continu. El
paquet de programari MOA, de l’angle`s Massive Online Analysis, e´s un entorn de mine-
ria de fluxos de codi obert, desenvolupat a la Universitat de Waikato, a Nova Zelanda.
Una de les funcionalitats de MOA e´s la possibilitat d’utilitzar filtres, els quals processen
les dades en flux abans o despre´s de ser redirigides cap a altres sub-sistemes, com ara
algorismes d’aprenentatge automa`tic.
Tot i que la mineria de dades ens aporta molts beneficis, les dades que s’analitzen so´n,
sovint, personals i sensibles. Ens trobem, doncs, davant d’un escenari en el que la
nostra privacitat esta` en perill. L’SDC, de l’angle`s Statistical Disclosure Control, e´s un
camp que estudia mecanismes per controlar que la informacio´ d’un individu espec´ıfic
no sigui extreta dels conjunts de dades publicades, alhora que s’intenta preservar la
utilitat estad´ıstica de les dades emmascarades. Aplicant te`cniques d’SDC, s’impedeix la
re-identificacio´ dels individus, protegint, per tant, la privacitat dels mateixos.
En aquest projecte s’han desenvolupat quatre filtres de preservacio´ de la privacitat per
l’entorn MOA, que implementen els segu¨ents me`todes d’SDC: addicio´ de soroll, mi-
croagregacio´, intercanvi de rangs i microagregacio´ de privacitat diferencial.
Cadascun dels algorismes ha estat adaptat d’algun me`tode ja conegut, en u´s, per habil-
itar la seva utilitzacio´ per a tasques de processament de fluxos. Finalment, tots quatre
filtres han estat avaluats respecte de dues mesures molt importants en l’a`mbit de l’SDC:
el risc de revelacio´ i la pe`rdua d’informacio´.
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Resumen
Implementing Privacy-Preserving Filters in the MOA
Stream Mining Framework
por David Mart´ınez Rodr´ıguez
La miner´ıa de datos nos ayuda a entender mejor los procesos antropoge´nicos y natu-
rales, analizando cantidades masivas de datos, mediante algoritmos de aprendizaje au-
toma´tico. La miner´ıa de flujos datos es un paradigma de ana´lisis que nos permite extraer
conocimiento de los datos, cuando e´stos son recibidos en forma de un flujo continuo. El
paquete de software MOA, del ingle´s Massive Online Analysis, es un entorno de miner´ıa
de flujos de co´digo abierto, desarrollado en la Universidad de Waikato, Nueva Zelanda.
Una de las funcionalidades de MOA es la posibilidad de utilizar filtros, los cuales proce-
san los datos de los flujos antes o despue´s de ser redirigidos hacia otros subsistemas,
como los algoritmos de aprendizaje automa´tico.
Aunque la miner´ıa de datos nos aporta muchos beneficios, los datos que se analizan
son frecuentemente personales y sensibles. Nos encontramos, pues, ante un escenario
en el que nuestra privacidad esta´ en peligro. El campo de SDC, del ingle´s Statistical
Disclosure Control, estudia los mecanismos para controlar que la informacio´n de un
individuo espec´ıfico no se extraiga de los conjuntos de datos publicados, a la vez que se
intenta maximizar la utilidad estad´ıstica de los datos enmascarados. Aplicando te´cnicas
de SDC, se impide la re-identificacio´n de los individuos, protegiendo, por lo tanto, la
privacidad de los mismos.
En este proyecto se han desarrollado cuatro filtros de preservacio´n de la privacidad
para el entorno MOA, que implementan los siguientes me´todos de SDC: adicio´n de
ruido, microagregacio´n, intercanvio de rangos y microagregacio´n de privaci-
dad diferencial. Cada uno de los algoritmos ha sido adaptado de algun me´todo ya
conocido y en uso, para habilitar su utilizacio´n para tareas de procesamiento de flujos.
Finalmente, los cuatro filtros se han evauado respecto dos medidas muy importantes en
el a´mbito del SDC: el riesgo de revelacio´n y la pe´rdida de informacio´n.
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Introduction
What follows is a brief introduction to the project under review in this report and its
context, in a broad sense. The structure of this document is also outlined in the last
section of this chapter.
1.1 Context
An overview is now given of the two main concepts that, when combined, drive the
motivation behind the inception and development of this project.
1.1.1 Data mining
Information society produces vast amounts of data all over the world. This data comes
from innumerable sources and in diverse formats, and has been stored for years in data
warehouses, waiting to be processed. With the continuous increase in computing power,
due to the recent advances in software and hardware technologies, the machine learning
field, also known as data science, has arisen, allowing us to exploit this stored data and
extract knowledge from it.
Data science is, indeed, a holistic process, where many different disciplines are involved,
from data acquisition and storage, through its selection, filtering and analysis up to
knowledge extraction, visualization and discovery.
Data science enables a better understanding of human or natural processes and pro-
vides us with means to identify trends, predict future events or discover useful patterns.
Its uses range from scientific and medical applications to social sciences or business
administration [1].
1
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Figure 1.1: Data mining as a process. Adapted from Fayyad et al. [1]
1.1.1.1 Facing the limits
Despite lots of efforts are put into enhancing different data mining processes, there still
are many cases where these techniques fail to perform well, mainly because of the scale
of the problems that we face nowadays.
On the one hand, traditional data mining workflows cannot cope with the really massive
data sets that are available nowadays, if performed on a common infrastructure. To
solve this issue, clusters of hundreds or thousands of computers are used to run such
analysis. It is costly and complex but, doing so, we can mine amounts of data in a way
that was unthinkable some time ago.
On the other hand, we face another type of scaling problem. In some situations, data
acquisition throughput is so high that it cannot be stored anyway, so another approach
is needed to avoid this loss of information, because we still want to analyze it to extract
knowledge from it. Both these scenarios are addressed with a series of techniques known
as stream mining.
1.1.1.2 Stream mining
Stream mining or data stream mining is a process that allows us to still discover knowl-
edge and patterns in data, even when it comes in the form of a continuous stream, or
many of them [2]. Instead of processing all statically stored data, like traditional data
mining does, a relatively small portion of it is kept during the analysis, and it is updated
when needed - either because more resources are available to the system or because new
data is acquired. A more deeper review of this research area is given in 2.1.
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1.1.2 Privacy
Privacy is a concept that can be defined as the ability of an individual or group to
seclude1 themselves, or information about themselves, and thereby express themselves
selectively. It is understood differently depending on the social and cultural background
of each individual, but it is in fact recognised as one of the most fundamental rights of
our human nature. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 12th article [4] states
that:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.
This right has been continuously violated ever since information exchange and advanced
communication technologies have been developed. Despite this did not begin with the
spread of the Internet, its adoption has greatly magnified both the ability to breach
people’s privacy and the impact that these breaches have. A more thorough analysis of
privacy and its interrelations with society and technology is given in Section 4.1.
1.1.3 Privacy Preserving Data Mining
Nowadays, data mining technologies have become a relevant debate topic, concerning
what information is collected from individuals, who owns it and what are the purposes
behind its gathering. Information technologies deliver us many benefits at many levels -
safer streets, cheaper communications, better health systems, more convenient shopping
- but at the high cost of losing our privacy.
Knowledge discovery processes need data to work and, in most cases, it is sensitive and
personal. Moreover, it is massively collected, stored and analyzed without the users
consent. Besides this lack of consent in the data acquisition stage of the process, data
mining poses a bigger thread on individuals: information disclosure. Sensitive data
must be treated accordingly, which involves not only good IT security practices to avoid
information leaks, but a responsible treatment when research results are published.
1.1.3.1 Statistical Disclosure Control
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) is the name that the statistical community has given
to what the data mining community calls Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM). This
1“Seclusion is the act of placing or keeping someone away from other people.” [3]
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field, whatever its preferred name is, deals with controlling that information about spe-
cific individuals is not extracted from statistical summary results. Also, if full datasets
are to be released, SDC methods should be applied to data in order to preserve user’s pri-
vacy, whilst maintaining the statistical significance of it, i. e., the amount of information
- knowledge - that this data can provide.
1.2 The project: moa-ppsm
Having reviewed the main concepts to which this project is related to, we can now outline
its main purpose, once we take a closer look to the technical environment in which it
will be developed.
1.2.1 MOA
MOA, initials for Massive Online Analysis, is an open source framework for data stream
mining [5], originally developed at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. It includes
several machine learning algorithms2 to perform the analysis and tools to evaluate the
quality of the results. It also deals with a problem known as concept drift3. It is related
to the well known and commonly used Weka4 package, but it is built to perform at a
greater scale for more demanding problems.
Figure 1.2: Massive Online Analysis logo.
1.2.1.1 MOA filters
One of the available features in MOA is the use of filters, which can process streaming
data before or after being fed to other systems or algorithms, such as learners or file
2Algorithms used to perform the actual data mining analysis (the “machine learning & visualization”
step on Figure 1.1) belong to the field of machine learning. In MOA, clustering, classification, regression,
outlier detection and recommender systems are available.
3It is said of statistical properties of a target variable being analyed, when they change over time in
unforeseen ways.
4Weka is a popular software package including classical data mining algorithms, this is, not stream
mining. It is also developed at the University of Waikato. [6]
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writers. However, few filters are currently shipped within the latest MOA distribution,
namely a filter to replace missing values5 and a filter that adds noise to data.
1.2.1.2 MOA extensions
When working with MOA, the environment consists of the core library, but extensions
can be used to enhance the existing methods or to provide additional features, based
on the core tools that MOA already provides. A series of extensions have been de-
veloped and can be found on MOA’s website, at http://moa.cms.waikato.ac.nz/
moa-extensions.
1.2.2 The project in a nutshell
Summing up, the aim of this project is to implement privacy preserving filters for
the MOA stream mining framework. This is, adapt some well-known SDC methods
to a stream mining environment and, more precisely, to the MOA software framework,
in the form of a MOA extension.
1.3 Report structure
The structure of this report gives an overview of the development process of the project,
from the theoretical foundations that are necessary to understand the work to the final
results and conclusions.
Chapter 2 covers the theory basis behind the SDC methods implemented in the project
and provides some insights on different stream mining approaches. Chapter 3 discusses
state of the art solutions concerning SDC for static databases (not streaming data).
Chapter 4 analyzes more thoroughly the motivation behind privacy-preserving data min-
ing by discussing practical questions like the relationship between society and privacy
or the legal framework that applies to the context of this project. Project management
is layed out in Chapter 5 and then the report turns to more technical related topics,
such as implementation details and desgin decisions, covered in Chapter 6, as well as
benchmarking, in Chapter 7. Finally, the report and project conclusions are given in
Chapter 8, covering both achievements and possible future work.
5In statistics, missing data, or missing values, occur when no data value is stored for the variable in an
observation. Missing data are a common occurrence and can have a significant effect on the conclusions
that can be drawn from the data.
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Theoretical framework
Before reviewing the state of the art and compare existing solutions to this project, to
better understand the contribution of this work, we will provide now an introductory
overview of the theoretical concepts related to this project on stream mining and privacy
preserving data mining mechanisms.
2.1 Stream Mining
Data stream mining is a relatively new field. Even though its theoretical foundation is
based in well-established statistical and computational approaches, it has not been until
recent years that this research area has experimented a great growth in interest.
The main problem when dealing with streaming data is the high throughput of data be-
ing analyzed, under computational resources constraints. Variable data rates is another
problem that has to be addressed too. Once these problems are resolved, the same kind
of data mining analysis as in the case of batch data processing are available: classifi-
cation, regression or clustering tasks, as well as outlier detection and recommendation
systems. We will not cover these techniques here, because they are not related to this
project, by themselves. Instead, we will have a look at some different stream mining
solutions, because their working principles do affect the way the project’s algorithms
will be implemented.
2.1.1 Stream mining approaches
Solutions provided in this field can be categorized into data-based and task-based ones [7],
depending on their approach.
6
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Figure 2.1: Processing a data stream using a sliding window approach. In the figure,
N is the size of the sliding window, in terms of the number of samples of the stream
being stored, whereas M is the number of attributes of the samples in the stream.
Data-based stream mining solutions
The idea behind these solutions is to use a subset of the original dataset to perform the
required analyses. Diverse techniques that have been used in this sense can further be
split into two more categories:
• Sampling methods: either by randomly picking samples of the data stream or
by randomly selecting chunks (subsets) of the stream, sampling methods discard
part of the incoming data, while performing the knowledge discovery processes
with the sampled data. The main problem with this approach is that is hard to
know when to pick a sample or which records should be stored, because there is
no previous knowledge of the dataset size or its information structure.
• Summarizing methods: they use aggregated data or calculated statistical mea-
sures (that are continuously recalculated) to provide the information needed for
the data mining algorithms. In this case, it is the loss of information and accu-
racy and the inability to control data distribution fluctuations what renders these
methods not so usable as it was desired.
Task-based stream mining solutions
The solutions that fall into this category are based not on performing data transforma-
tions, but on changing the data mining methods to enable their use on data streams.
• Approximation algorithms: these are a kind of algorithms that are designed
to solve computationally hard problems, by giving an approximate result. Instead
of computing exact solutions, they just guarantee a certain error bound. The
problem with these methods is, again, the high received data throughput, which
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they cannot cope as well. Additional tooling is therefore needed if one wishes to
use them.
• Sliding window method: this method, a common pattern in many online1
applications, maintains a sliding window in which the most recent data is kept.
As data is received from the incoming streams, this window “advances” so new
observations are kept inside, as can be seen in Figure 2.1. The data mining analyses
are then performed using the data available inside the window and summarized
versions of the older records, in the form of statistical measures or aggregated data.
This particular method is the one that the MOA package uses - thus its name:
Massive Online Analysis. This solution scheme enables dealing with concept drift,
which would not be possible if just aggregated data was used.
• Algorithm output granularity: this method is a resource-aware data analy-
sis approach that can perform the local analysis on resource constrained devices,
by adapting to resource availability and data stream rates - when resources are
completely running out, the results are merged and stored.
2.2 Statistical Disclosure Control
As was already introduced in Section 1.1.3, the purpose of Statistical Disclosure Control
(SDC) is to prevent confidential information from being linked to specific individuals to
whom this data belongs. We will review now some concepts related to data disclosure
and SDC methods and some theoretical foundations.
2.2.1 Privacy preserving algorithms
As a quick and superficial review, the algorithms2 being used nowadays to achieve ef-
fective privacy preserving in datasets can be categorized into the following groups [8]:
• Non-perturbative data masking: these kind of methods do not perform data values
transformations. Instead, they are based in partial suppressions of records or
reductions of detail of the datasets. Some examples are:
– Sampling
– Global recoding
1In computer science, an online algorithm is one that can process its input piece-by-piece in a serial
fashion, i.e., in the order that the input is fed to the algorithm, without having the entire input available
from the start.
2We will not cover every algorithm in detail, because some of them are not included in the scope of
this project.
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– Top and bottom coding
– Local suppression
• Perturbative data masking: these methods do release the whole dataset, if required,
but it is perturbed, this is, values are changed by adding them noise. This way,
records are diffused and reidentifying individuals is harder. Some examples are:
– Noise masking
– Micro-aggregation
– Rank swapping
– Data shuffling
– Rounding
– Re-sampling
– PRAM
– MASSC
2.2.2 Definitions of disclosure
When assessing the disclosure risks of a given dataset (or data stream) we must have a
look at the different kind of variables this data is composed of. We will stick to a clas-
sic [9] categorization of such attributes into three groups, which need not be disjunctive,
as follows:
• Identifiers: variables that precisely identify individuals, e.g., social insurance
numbers, person names, or addresses.
• Quasi-identifiers: a set of variables that, when considered together, can be used
to identify individual units. It might be possible to, for example, identify people
by combining variables such as gender, age, region and occupation.
• Non-identifying variables: these are neither identifiers nor quasi-identifiers.
Concerning disclosure, it is also defined differently depending on the type of privacy
breach that has occurred:
• We talk about identity disclosure when a specific individual record can be recog-
nised in a dataset, i.e., when linkage with external available data is possible. Iden-
tity disclosure is performed using direct identifiers, rare combinations of values
in quasi-identifier attributes and exact knowledge of variable values in external
databases.
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• In the case of attribute disclosure, the intruder is able to gather sensitive informa-
tion about a specific unit from the released data, where it is directly available. For
example, if no perturbation is applied to the original values of the wages variable,
one could learn how much a person is earning if its identity is disclosed too.
• Inferential disclosure, the most general case, occurs when an intruder is able to,
with some uncertainty, predict or infer confidential information about an individ-
ual from the statistical properties of data.
It is important to remark that a subset of critical variables might be exploited to disclose
every information about a single unit in a dataset. Thus, we are bound to carefully
select which variables of the dataset might be released to further users of the data, while
trying to maximize its statistical utility. More concretely, it is extremely important
to not release identifiers and to analyze quasi-identifiers closely, in order to avoid
information leaks and privacy breaches.
2.2.3 Disclosure Risk
Concerning the safety of the released data, Disclosure Risk (DR) is a common way to
measure and assess the risk of re-identification of particular individuals. Re-identification
happens when some sensitive and confidential data that have been released are subse-
quently linked to a particular individual, which results in a confidentiality breach. There
are a number of different approaches in how to assess disclosure risk and whether to mea-
sure it per record or globally, taking into account the whole dataset.
As noted in [10], there is not much literature on disclosure risk that can be used for a
broad class of perturbative methods; disclosure risk measures tend instead to be method-
specific. Therefore, empirical methods are most used to assess disclosure risk for these
kind of methods.
2.2.3.1 Record linkage
Most notably, the mechanisms used to measure disclosure risk follow a record linkage ap-
proach. This is, after an SDC method has been used to anonymize data, a record linkage
procedure is applied to the original and released (masked, anonymized) datasets. This
linkage attempts to identify, for each record in the masked dataset, which is the corre-
sponding record in the original dataset. If such correspondance is verified, the record
is labeled as correctly linked. A generic measure for disclosure risk is the percentage of
correctly linked records from the total amount in the dataset.
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• Distance-based record linkage: provided that a distance measure can be de-
fined between the original and the masked datasets, linkage is performed as fol-
lows: for each record in the anonymized dataset, a distance to each record in
the original dataset is calculated. The nearest record, in terms of this distance
measurement, is assumed to be the corresponding record, thus establishing a link
between them. This linkage is then verified to assess how many of these guesses
are true re-identifications.
• Probabilistic record linkage: in this case, the matching algoritm works a little
different. For each possible pair of original and masked records, a coincidence
vector is defined. This vector holds, for each attribute, whether or not the values
of the considered records are equal. An index is computed afterwards over these
vectors and, using such index, the records pairs are classified as linked or not linked.
Again, this linkage is verified to assess the number of true re-identifications.
2.2.4 Information Loss
Another key measurement concerning data protection is Information Loss (IL) or
data utility, which could be defined as the amount of useful statistical information that
is lost along the data masking process. A good SDC method should try to minimize
IL, in order to provide optimally useful data to the legitimate users of such data, while
also keeping a low disclosure risk. It is important to note that these two properties are
inversely proportional: the lower disclosure risk is, the higher information loss will occur.
This trade off between these two parameters is often a difficult and challenging task and
should be taken into very careful consideration, depending on the release policies that
apply, the kind of data being released and the sensitivity of the information contained
in such data. This evaluation should be performed not only from a purely quantitave
and numerical point of view, but from an ethical and privacy concerned one too.
As well as with disclosure risk, a number of methods and approaches are taken to assess
information loss when releasing privacy protected datasets, ranging from unbounded [11]
to probabilistic (bound to the [0, 1] interval) measurements [12].
Unbounded Information Loss
An example framework to assess IL was given in [11], which evaluates some key sta-
tistical properties of the released data. More concretely, it computes three discrepancy
measurements for a series of pairs of matrices (correlation, covariance, etc. of the origi-
nal and masked datasets), namely the mean square error, the mean absolute error and
the mean variation.
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Probabilistic Information Loss
The aim of measuring IL in a probabilistic manner is to bound this measurement to
the [0, 1] range, thus allowing its comparison with DR, which is also generally expressed
within this range. This way, a score could be calculated from both normalized measures
for an SDC method, easing parameters selection to data protectors, for example.
2.2.5 Privacy guarantees
Many different methods have been developed to help prevent information disclosure when
data mining datasets or results are released. These algorithms pursue the generation of
results or data that have particular properties concerning privacy preservation. Some of
the desirable properties of privacy-protected data are described in the following sections,
but no formal definition is provided for some of them (please refer to the original papers
and publications to understand them better).
2.2.5.1 k-Anonymity
First described in 2002, by Latanya Sweeney, a release of data is said to have the k-
anonymity property if the information for each person contained in the release cannot
be distinguished from at least k − 1 individuals whose information also appears in the
release [13]. A more formal definition uses the previously reviewed concept of quasi-
identifiers (see Section 2.2.2).
Definition 2.1. (k-Anonymity)
A dataset is said to satisfy k-anonymity for an integer k > 1 if, for each combina-
tion of values of quasi-identifiers, at least k records exist in the dataset sharing that
combination. [14]
An intruder trying to use a k-anonymous dataset to do, for example, record linkage
against an external source of information will find that at least k records in the dataset
match any value of the quasi-identifiers that he or she is trying to use to perform the
linkage. Thus, re-identification is limited to groups, this is, no individual records can be
linked, just groups of size at least k.
2.2.5.2 l-Diversity
The evolution of the concept of k-anonymity is l-diversity and adds further privacy
preservation by adding intra-group diversity, so to avoid the flaws of the k-anonymity
privacy model [15].
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2.2.5.3 t-Closeness
Further on, the t-closeness property definition adds attribute-based privacy enforcement
to the l-diversity model: to better preserve privacy, all values (all observations) from a
particular attribute must not be too much different - instead, they should be close up
to a certain threshold [16]. This is needed to preserve the privacy of those records that
are more easily identifiable because their attribute values are more distinguishable.
2.2.5.4 Differential Privacy
Described in Dwork [17], differential privacy is a condition on the release mechanism
(not the dataset) that guarantees a strong privacy preservation level for some particular
data uses contexts. Differential privacy is introduced in an interactive setting, i.e., in a
query-response data retrieval environment, and offers probabilistic guarantees that the
contribution of any single individual to thenquery response is limited.
Definition 2.2. (ε-Differential privacy)
A randomized mechanism3 M gives ε-differential privacy if, for all datasets X1, X2
such that one can be obtained from the other by modifying a single record, and all
S ⊂ Range(M), it holds
P (M(X1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε)× P (M(X2) ∈ S) (2.1)
This definition, cited from Soria-Comas et al. [14], easier to understand than the original
one given in Dwork [17], states that, given an ε-differential privacy mechanism M and
any possible output r, the presence or abscence of a participant (in terms of the dataset,
a row) will cause at most a multiplicative eε change in the probability of the mechanism
to output a response r.
2.3 SDC methods
We will describe now some of the most common methods and mechanisms used in SDC
applications to anonymize data or provide privacy preserving data releases.
Notation
We assume the following notation for the subsequent method descriptions:
3By mechanism, we refer to any kind of function or system used to query for data.
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• The original dataset is the matrix X, with n rows (samples) and m attributes or
variables. Therefore, the xij element of the dataset denotes the value that the j-th
attribute takes in the i-th row for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
• The anonymized (protected) dataset is named X ′.
2.3.1 Noise Addition
Noise addition or additive noise masking is a fairly simple method that is based on the
addition of gaussian noise to data, thus randomly distorting its values and difficulting
re-identification of individuals. The main additive noise algorithms in the literature
are [8, p. 54]:
• Uncorrelated noise addition.
• Correlated noise addition.
• Noise addition and linear transformation.
• Noise addition and non-linear transformation.
We will only cover the first couple of methods, because of the inherent difficulty of the
latter, both in its theoretical basis and its practical implementation, which renders them
not suitable for the needs of this project.
2.3.1.1 Uncorrelated noise addition
Masking by additive noise the j-th variable of an original datasetX yields an anonymized
dataset X ′ such that
x′ij = xij +  for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (2.2)
where  is drawn from a random variable εj ∼ N(0, σ2εj ). The general assumption is
that the variances of each εj are proportional to those of the original variables, this is,
if Var(Xj) = σ
2
j is the variance of the j-th attibute of the dataset X, then σ
2
εj := ασ
2
j .
While this method preserves means and covariances, it is, unfortunately, not able to
preserve variances nor correlation coefficients.
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2.3.1.2 Correlated noise addition
This method is aimed to also preserve correlation coefficients, with respect to uncor-
related noise addition. The main difference with the previous mechanism is that the
covariance matrix of the errors is now proportional to the covariance matrix of the data:
ε ∼ N(0,Σε), where Σε = αΣ.
Masking by correlated noise addition provides data with higher analytical utility than
masking using uncorrelated noise, as long as α is revealed to the data user. However,
the low level of protection yielded by this method and the previous one render them as
not very useful for truly important SDC applications.
2.3.2 Microaggregation
Originally described for continuous (numerical) data, microaggregation is a family of
SDC methods that, in the most general form, consist of making homogeneous groups of
k or more individuals (rows) from within the X dataset to later replace their values with
aggregated ones, this is, averages, computed on the groups themselves. These grouped
and aggregated records conform the resulting X ′ release dataset.
Two main approaches are taken when considering microaggregation techniques: uni-
variate and multivariate microaggregation. The difference remains in the number of
variables used to perform the clustering phase of the method: a single variable and
multiple attributes, correspondingly. As can be assessed in the literature, the univariate
approach causes either a very high information loss or a very high disclosure risk, thus
not being appropriate for normal SDC uses [8, p. 63]. On the other hand, multivariate
microaggregation, proposed by Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz [18], is considered an
excellent protection method and, as such, we will focus on this approach.
It is important to note that this family of techniques are directly related to k-anonymity,
as proved in Domingo-Ferrer and Torra [19].
2.3.2.1 Partition
The first and most computational complex task to do in a microaggregation method is
to partition the dataset into g groups of size at least k > 1, which is, indeed, a clustering
task. This proves to be quite difficult, but an optimal solution approximation with
respect to information loss was already given in [19] and further refined in Domingo-
Ferrer et al. [20].
The aim of these partition methods is to find the optimal k-partition that maximizes
within-group homogeneity. Following Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz [18], a practical
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information loss measure for microaggregation, relatively common in the clustering lit-
erature, is the ratio of within-group homogeneity over the total sum of squares (the sum
of within and between group homogeneity)
L =
SSE
SST
(2.3)
The within-group homogeneity (SSE) is defined as
SSE =
g∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(xij − x¯i)2 (2.4)
where g denotes the total number of groups of ni elements each and x¯i denotes the i-th
group centroid. The between-groups sum of squares, SSA, is
SSA =
g∑
i=1
ni(x¯i − x¯)2 (2.5)
where x¯ is the average vector over the whole dataset. The total sum of squares is, then,
SST = SSE + SSA.
Because microaggregation replaces values in a group by the group centroid, if we re-
call Equation 2.3, it follows that the higher the within-group homogeneity, the lower the
information loss is. Both the MDAV [19] (Maximum Distance to Average Vector) and
µ-Approx [20] algorithms are built to partition the dataset into groups, while minimizing
information loss, exploiting the previous theoretical result.
2.3.2.2 Aggregation
The aggregation step is the simplest of the ones that take place in a microaggregation
setting: for each group g of at least k records and for each attribute 1 ≤ j ≤ m, an
aggregate γ is computed among the values of the j-th variable for the records in the
group. This aggregate is then imputed to each record for its j-th attribute.
Concerning the types of variables that are aggregated [19]:
• Continuous attributes: the aggregated value correponds with the arithmetical
mean of the selected values.
• Categorical attributes: the aggregated value should either be the median or
the mode of the selected values.
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2.3.3 Rank Swapping
Also a fairly simple SDC method, the basic idea behind data swapping and its refinement,
rank swapping, is to transform a dataset by exchanging values of confidential variables
in such a way that marginals are maintained. The method works as follows:
First, values of a variable j are ranked in ascending order, this is, they are sorted. Each
ranked value is then swapped with another ranked value, randomly chosen within a
restricted range. This range is controlled by an input parameter p, normally denoting
that swapped values cannot differ more than p% of the total number of records. This
procedure is applied for every variable in the dataset.
2.3.4 Laplace Mechanism
We recall now the context of differential privacy to discuss a relatively extended method
that is designed to achieve this privacy preserving guarantee. However, this technique is
restricted to a particular family of data release functions. More precisely, it can only be
applied to functions that provide a numerical answer, like counting queries, for example.
To understand this method, called Laplace mechanism, we must review first the concept
of global sensitivity of a function.
Definition 2.3. (Neighbour datasets)
Given two datasets from a universe of datasets, D1, D2 ∈ D, we call them neighbours if
they differ in just one record, which we indicate using the notation |D1∆D2| = 1.
Definition 2.4. (Global Sensitivity of a function)
We define the global sensitivity of a numerical function f : D → Rw, with w ∈ N+, over
the universe of datasets D, as
∆(f) = max
D1,D2 ∈ D
|D1∆D2| = 1
‖f(D1)− f(D2)‖1 (2.6)
As we will now see, the Laplace mechanism is just a noise addition masking method,
where the sensitivity of the release function f drives the amount of noise being added
to the response of f : the higher the sensitivity of the function, the higher the amount
of noise added. If f is applied to a dataset D1 and then to a neighboring dataset D2,
if f changes a lot, it means that we will have to add more noise to probably obtain the
same output.
Definition 2.5. (Laplace mechanism)
Given a database D ∈ D and a function f : D → Rw, with w ∈ N+ and global sensitivity
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∆, an ε-differential privacy mechanism M for releasing f is to publish
M(D) = f(D) + L (2.7)
where L is a vector of random variables each drawn from a Laplace distribution Lap(0, ∆(f)ε ).
This mechanism ensures that ε-differential privacy is achieved for the release function
f , as can be assessed in Leoni [21] and Soria-Comas et al. [14].
Laplace distribution
On a quick note to understand the kind of noise being added through the Laplace
mechanism, a Laplace distribution Lap(µ, b) has location µ (which could be understood
as the mean or the location of the peak of the PDF of the distribution) and scale
parameter b. This last parameter is the one used to adjust the amount of perturbation
the data or release method will receive.
Figure 2.2: Laplace distribution probability density function (PDF). Source:
Wikipedia [22]
The density function of the Laplace noise, also called double exponential, is
P (x|µ, b) = 1
2b
exp(−|x− µ|
b
) (2.8)
Chapter 3
State of the art
This chapter gives further insights concerning the latest discoveries and cutting-edge
technological solutions related to the main knowledge fields that affect this project:
data stream mining and statistical disclosure control.
3.1 Stream mining software
Data stream mining is a relatively new field. Even though its theoretical foundation is
based in well-established statistical and computational approaches, it has not been until
recent years that this research area has experimented a great growth in interest Gaber
[7].
Because it is an incipient field, stream mining software packages are quite uncommon.
Even though specific applications have been developed (see Kargupta [41]), MOA re-
mains as one of the few generic, free and open sourced systems. One example of a com-
mercial solution that includes support for data stream mining is RapidMiner, through
the use of plugins.
MOA is currently the most complete framework for data stream clustering research
and it is an important pioneer in experimenting with data stream algorithms. MOA’s
advantages are that it interfaces with WEKA, provides already a set of data stream
classification and clustering algorithms and it has a clear Java interface to add new
algorithms or use the existing algorithms in other applications.
Related to MOA, a new project called SAMOA (from Scalable Advanced Massive On-
line Analysis) is being developed too, based on MOA itself and a couple of streaming
processing engines: Apache S4 [46] and Apache Storm [47], developed by the Apache
Software Foundation.
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Figure 3.1: MOA’s Graphical User Interface, showing the clustering visualization
capabilities of the software.
Finally, an R package called stream was released into the CRAN repository1 in 2013. It
allows to do real time analytics on data streams and is currently focused on clustering
algorithms available in MOA.
3.1.1 The MOA framework
Massive Online Analysis (MOA) is a software environment for implementing algorithms
and running experiments for online learning from evolving data streams. MOA is de-
signed to deal with the challenging problems of scaling up the implementation of state
of the art algorithms to real world dataset sizes and of making algorithms comparable
in benchmark streaming settings.
MOA contains a collection of offline and online algorithms for both classification and
clustering as well as tools for evaluation. Researchers benefit from MOA by getting
insights into workings and problems of different approaches, practitioners can easily
compare several algorithms and apply them to real world data sets and settings.
MOA supports bi-directional interaction with WEKA, the Waikato Environment for
Knowledge Analysis, which is an award-winning open-source workbench containing im-
plementations of a wide range of batch machine learning methods. WEKA is also written
in Java. The main benefits of Java are portability, where applications can be run on any
1The capabilities of the R language are extended through user-created packages. Most of these
packages are available at the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), on the following web address:
http://cran.r-project.org.
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platform with an appropriate Java virtual machine, and the strong and well-developed
support libraries. Use of the language is widespread, and features such as the automatic
garbage collection help to reduce programmer burden and error.
The MOA framework provides a graphical user interface (GUI), which eases its use, when
experiments can be carried out using the algorithms already included in the framework.
However, for more complicated analysis or industry-scaled uses, MOA offers the pos-
sibility to be used using a command line interface, which is extremely powerful and
flexible. Also, due to its open source nature and the fact that it is built in Java, cus-
tom procedures and integration techniques can be developed to meet the data analysis
requirements. Last but not least, when the core features are not sufficient for the user’s
needs, MOA can be extended with new mining algorithms, new stream generators or
evaluation measures, like the SDC filters that we will implement in this project.
3.2 Statistical Disclosure Control software
With the advent of new technologies and the Internet widespread, concepts like Open
Data2 are beginning to arise. Information exchange within the Internet is a very powerful
way to share knowledge and allow others — researchers, statistical agencies and any other
user — get insights from the analysis of this data. However, the released data must be
protected against disclosure attacks, to enhance data owners privacy.
Figure 3.2: sdcMicro package graphical user interface.
2Open data is the idea that certain data should be freely available to everyone to use and republish
as they wish, without restrictions from copyright, patents or other mechanisms of control.
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Some software suites have been developed to provide the SDC tools needed to effectively
anonymize the released datasets. The most prominent of these is the sdcMicro package.
It is a free R-based open source suite for the generation of protected data for researchers
and public use. It can be used for the generation of anonymized data, i.e. for the
creation of public and scientific-use files. In addition, various risk estimation methods
are included. Moreover, the sdcMicro package it is bundled with a graphical user
interface for some of the SDC methods it offers.
The sdcMicro includes all the methods of another popular software, called µ-ARGUS3,
along with some more new methods. A series of documents can be found on the official
website of the package concerning its usage.
3The µ-ARGUS suite can be found on http://neon.vb.cbs.nl/casc/mu.htm, but it seems to be
quite an outdated software.
Chapter 4
Practical aspects
This chapter addresses the practical aspects of this project, this is, those that are related
to the praxis1, rather than to technology or theory. An analysis of the concept of privacy
and the need to protect it is given in the first section of the chapter, followed by a short
review of the legal framework that applies to this project and, finally, a brief note on
the environmental impact of the present work.
4.1 Privacy & society
Privacy has become a hot topic in debates nowadays, concerning what information is
collected from individuals, who owns it and with which purposes. It is a matter of great
importance and certainly worth to be examined carefully. Information technologies have
brought us many benefits at many levels — safer streets, cheaper communications, better
health systems, more convenient shopping — but many times at the high cost of losing
our privacy. With the rapid adoption of the Internet and all sorts of digital telecom-
munications as the basis of our modern communication relationships, a vast capacity of
interception, storage and analysis of such information exchanges has been reached. This
potential has been used by companies in the private sector to, for example, analyze the
population consuming profiles, target marketing campaigns more accurately and offer
much more customized products and services. In order to apply these techniques and
mechanisms, corporations collect private data from users, excusing that these same users
accept privacy terms and conditions. It seems clear that data mining is highly related to
privacy: knowledge discovery processes need data to work and, in most cases, sensitive
personal data is at stake.
1Praxis is the process by which a theory, lesson, or skill is enacted, embodied, or realised. Praxis
may also refer to the act of engaging, applying, exercising, realizing, or practicing ideas.
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We have already outlined in Section 2.2 that the aim of SDC and this project in particular
is to protect users privacy by avoiding information disclosure from released datasets and
real time analysis processes that require sensitive data. The question, however, is: why
do we need to protect privacy? What urges us to preserve our right to privacy? It is
not a simple and mere question; indeed, the answer is related to our understanding and
interpretation of the term “privacy” itself. Therefore, we will review the definition of
privacy and provide an argument that is the basis to justify privacy protection.
In the introductory chapter of the report (see Section 1.1.2) an introduction to the
concept of privacy was given by literally reproducing a dictionary definition: “Privacy is
a concept that can be defined as the ability of an individual or group to seclude themselves,
or information about themselves, and thereby express themselves selectively”. We also
saw that privacy is recognised as one of our most fundamental rights, as it is enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Going further on, privacy, understood
not only as the mechanism that allows us to keep our opinion and ideas private, but also
the rest of our praxis, enables us to develop a particular personality, yet when we are
within a social structure. Without the right to keep certain aspects of our life private, the
individuation process is compromised and many consequences of this individual diversity
are endangered — thought heterogeneity, for example, cultural heritage and, above all,
individuals emancipation, all because the individuation process does not happen in a
context of complete freedom.
We must not forget that when organizations such as enterprises or governments acquire
massive amounts of private information about particular individuals, a certain control
capacity on these individuals is gained too. This power, on the contrary of what ulti-
mate defendants of data gathering hold, does not liberate people nor make them safer.
The true consequence of such an increase in control power is that all equitable bonds
between individuals and these organisms are torn apart: people become dominated by
social institutions, be them governments or any kind of structured association, and their
freedom is, thus, canceled. There is no possible emancipation nor conviviality of people
in a social context if the individuals-society relationships are domain based.
Finally, from a more pragmatic point of view, not only ethical concerns are addressed by
protecting users privacy, but economical issues too. Industrial-scale information theft
has a huge impact on enterprise economies, because of distrust and because disclosed
sensitive data can be used to make profit of it. Identity theft, for example, was estimated
to have a cost in the order of billions of dollars, back in 2005, as shown by Romanosky
[23].
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4.1.1 Impact of this project
The motivation of the project is now well-founded: privacy is a relevant concern for any
data analysis related field, whether it is statistics, data mining or data stream processing.
Of course, this project addresses just a small portion of the broader picture of privacy
protection, but it is indeed another effort taken towards its effective achievement.
Together with good IT security practices, a reasonable usage of data and information
and ackowledged consent from the data owners, the application of SDC techniques —
like the ones implemented by the privacy filters which conform the goal of this project
— enables the preservation of the inalienable right to privacy.
To provide further examples of the impact of the project, potential users of the MOA
privacy filters are both companies and government statistical agencies, which handle
vasts amounts of sensitive and personal data. Using SDC methods, they would be able
to exploit the intrinsic knowledge of these data, while preserving privacy and protect-
ing their users against disclosure attacks. Not only they could carry more interesting
experiments, but they could also release this information, sharing it with third par-
ties to promote collaboration with researchers and, last but not least, as an exercise of
transparency.
4.2 Legal framework
One of the aspects to bear in mind when developing a technological project is the legal
environment in which it is framed. To this respect, efforts are being carried out to develop
legal frameworks to help protect people’s privacy, at many levels. One such example
is the spanish LOPD2, a law that aims, among other things, to define different data
privacy levels and mandatory proceedings associated to each - no matter the medium
used to transfer it or store it. The full text of the law can be consulted at the BOE [24].
There are some pitfalls to these legislative efforts, though. Firstly, it is really hard to
assess their accomplishment in the IT sector and, thus, it is sometimes a matter of
confidence in the developer’s good practice. Another important drawback is that online
services, such as social networks, can be accessed globally, but, on the other hand, their
legislative framework is that of the country to which the backing company offering the
2LOPD stands for Ley Orga´nica de Proteccio´n de Datos, a law that was approved by the spanish
courts in 1999. It has been modified several times, being the law enforcement regulation approved in
2007.
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service belongs to - jurisdiction definition in the Internet is still a matter of intense
debate nowadays3.
We have not detected any kind of legal consequences or regulations bound to this
project’s development, besides intellectual property protection measures — no personal
data has yet been used to perform any benchmarking process nor to assess the quality of
the developed methods: random data generators are being used instead (see Chapter 7).
As we already stated before, concerning the code base of the project, we must implement
all necessary copyright protection mechanisms. Because this is an open source project,
an internationally recognised software license is included in the public code repository,
hosted at GitHub4. The chosen license is the MIT License, which has proven to be easy
to understand, relatively widespread and quite permissive in terms of its commercial
applicability.
4.3 Environmental issues
No relevant direct environmental impact is related to this project, neither tied to its
development nor its further deployment. No use of massive resources is done and the
results of the work do not, presumably, result in a significant environmental change of
any kind.
It is still true, however, that data mining as a discipline, does consume a lot of resources,
in terms of technological infrastructure and energy. We cannot forget that collecting,
storing and processing data at the scale that we have reached needs entire data centers
fully dedicated to the data mining process. Power consumption is a big concern with
nowadays information technology, as it is the huge amount of rare materials that elec-
tronic devices contain. These highlights are indeed indirect effects of the data mining
process.
3Proof of this debate is the emergence of initiatives like the Internet & Jurisdiction Project, which
was launched in 2012 to address the tension between the cross-border nature of the Internet and the
patchwork of national jurisdictions. To enable the digital coexistence of different norms in shared cross-
border online spaces, it facilitates a neutral multi-stakeholder dialogue process, which brings together
governments, civil society groups, major Internet platforms, technical operators and international orga-
nizations [25].
4The project is available at https://github.com/necavit/moa-ppsm.
Chapter 5
Project management
This chapter discusses all the aspects concerning the management of the project: scope,
schedule and budget. However, we must stress that this classical approach of management
analysis is not really suited for our needs. Instead, a more Agile1 methodology will be
applied. We cover this on the Methodology section, but there is an important conceptual
change to be taken into account: the different driving force of the project. Whereas in
classical project management the scope-schedule-budget triad is what must be controlled,
in an Agile project management approach it is value. Indeed, quality must be ensured
so maximum value is delivered to the project’s stakeholders, thus being scope, cost and
schedule just secondary constraints to these primary goals.
Figure 5.1: Traditional to Agile project management evolution. Source: Agile Aus-
tralia - Opening keynotes [27]
1Agile software development is based on the Agile manifesto [26].
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5.1 Goals & scope
One of the first things to do when beginning any project is delimiting its scope, this is,
deciding what will be done and how, in terms of resources and methodology.
We already stated in Section 1.2 what the main goal of this project is:
Main goal:
Implement privacy preserving filters for the Massive Online Analysis
(MOA) stream mining framework.
5.1.1 Requirements analysis
For the sake of completeness and verbosity, a more detailed list of the project’s re-
quirements is given in the next couple of sections, categorized into functional2 and
non-functional3 ones. Together, they comprise the formal scope of the project.
Functional requirements
R1 Implement privacy preserving stream mining filters4 for the MOA stream min-
ing framework. The suggested algorithms to be implemented correspond with
the following requirements:
R1-1 Noise addition [8, p. 54]
R1-2 Multiplicative noise [8, p. 57]
R1-3 Microaggregation [8, p. 60]
R1-4 Rank swapping [8, p. 73]
R1-5 Differential privacy [17]
R2 Evaluate technological alternatives prior to the implementation of the privacy
filters.
R3 Benchmark the performance of the filters in terms of disclosure risk and infor-
mation loss.
2Functional requirements explain what has to be done by identifying the necessary task, action or
activity that must be accomplished.
3Non-functional requirements are requirements that specify criteria that can be used to judge the
operation of a system, rather than specific behaviors.
4Within the MOA context, filters are procedures applied to data prior to their analysis using machine
learning algorithms.
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Non-functional requirements
NFR1 Correctness: privacy protection is at stake in this project, so algorithms must
be implemented correctly, from the theoretical point of view, in order to not
ease information disclosure when they are used.
NFR2 Efficiency: given that no data mining process can scale well if its algorithms
are slow, effort will be put in making them the most efficient we can.
NFR3 Test coverage: measures and tests will be performed to assess the quality of
the developed software, as well as its scalability and performance, which is
paramount in this project’s context.
NFR4 Documentation: MOA is an open source data mining framework, which means
that its community can assess how is it built and how to improve it. One of the
benefits of the open source development model is that software can be safer,
more robust and efficient, by receiving contributions from different developers.
If people are to continue improving the work done, it has to be well documented.
5.1.2 Scope deviations
There have been no major changes in the scope of the project along its development.
Both the functional and non-functional requirements sets remain the same as the ones
defined in the final report of the Project Management course (and also listed above).
However, concerning its completion, we have to admit that not all requirements have
been achieved. We provide now an enumeration of the functional requirements and their
final status:
R1 [Mostly completed] Implement privacy preserving stream mining filters for
the MOA stream mining framework.
R1-1 [Completed] Noise addition [8, p. 54]
R1-2 [Not completed] Multiplicative noise [8, p. 57]
R1-3 [Completed] Microaggregation [8, p. 60]
R1-4 [Completed] Rank swapping [8, p. 73]
R1-5 [Completed] Differential privacy [17]
R2 [Completed] Evaluate technological alternatives prior to the implementation
of the privacy filters.
R3 [Completed] Benchmark the performance of the filters in terms of disclosure
risk and information loss.
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Even though the R1-2 requirement could not be finished, and further work would be
possible, as will be discussed in the Conclusions section, the Agile approach for this
project has enabled us to avoid a sense of failure at the end of its development.
5.2 Methodology
The methodology approach used in this project will be based on Agile principles. Some
of the key concepts and practices related to Agile software development are:
• Iterative development versus the classical waterfall development model.
• Short to mid range development sprints (phases), in order to keep track of the
project’s evolution and to be able to react to changes, unforeseen constraints or
scope drifts.
• Constant meetings with the project’s stakeholders, in which the progress and
deviations of the project are assessed.
• Usage of burndown charts - a graphical model of work left to do versus time -
and other visual representations of the project’s track
• Reduced documentation generation, to alleviate the potential loss of time that
changes in the requirements would cause.
Among many other approaches and Agile methodological frameworks, Scrum is one of
the most well-known due its flexibility, its proved resilience against requirements rapid
changes and easy adoption by software development teams.
5.2.1 Scrum
Scrum is an iterative and incremental agile software development methodology for
managing product development. It challenges assumptions of the traditional, sequential
approach to product development, and enables teams to self-organize by encouraging
physical location or close online collaboration of all team members, as well as daily
face-to-face communication among all team members and disciplines in the project [28].
This methodology is based on the adoption of certain roles, as well as some artifacts
and predefined processes, all of which can be adapted as necessary by the team to suit
their specific needs and resources. However, a central concept forms the basis for the
rest of the framework: the sprint. A sprint or iteration is the basic unit of development
in Scrum. The sprint is a timeboxed effort, this is, it is restricted to a specific duration,
which is fixed in advance for each sprint and is normally between one week and one
month, with two weeks being the most common.
Project management 31
15 days
24 h
Working increment
of the softwareSprint Backlog SprintProduct Backlog
Figure 5.2: Scrum methodology process overview. Adapted from Wikimedia [29]
Roles
The follwing are the relevant roles that emerge in a Scrum developed project:
• Product owner: the product owner represents the stakeholders and is the voice
of the customer. He or she is accountable for ensuring that the team delivers value
to the business. The product owner writes user stories (tasks) and adds them to
the product backlog, prioritizing them.
• Scrum master: Scrum is facilitated by a scrum master, who is accountable for
removing impediments to the ability of the team to deliver the product goals and
deliverables. The scrum master is not a traditional team lead or project manager,
but acts as a buffer between the team and any distracting influences. The scrum
master ensures that the scrum process is used as intended.
• Development team: the development team is responsible for delivering poten-
tially shippable increments of product at the end of each sprint. A team is made
up of 3–9 individuals with cross-functional skills who do the actual work: analyse,
design, develop, test, document, etc. Finally, it is important to emphasize that
the development team in Scrum is self-organizing.
Events
A series of events take place during the Scrum process, configuring the actual workflow
of the team. We will provide an overview of some of them:
• Sprint planning: at the beginning of a sprint, the team holds a sprint planning
event, in which the work to be done is selected from the product backlog and
transferred to the sprint backlog.
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• Daily Scrum: a stand-up, timeboxed and short meeting takes place every day
during each sprint. In these meetings, every member of the team explains the work
carried out the previous day, discusses any impediment or blocking situation he or
she has encountered and decides which tasks will do in the following day.
• Retrospective: at the end of each sprint, a review of the work that has been
completed is made, and the team reflects on the past sprint to identify and agree
on any process improvement, which requires actions to be taken in the upcoming
sprint.
Artifacts
Even though we have given an overview of some of them, the following artifacts are the
remaining pieces that shape up the Scrum process and methodology:
• Product backlog: the product backlog is an ordered list of requirements that
is maintained for a product. It consists of features, bug fixes, non-functional
requirements, etc., i.e., whatever needs to be done in order to successfully deliver
a viable product. The items in this backlog are ordered by the product owner
based on considerations like risk, business value, dependencies or date needed, for
example.
• Sprint backlog: The sprint backlog is the list of work the development team must
address during the next sprint. The list is derived by selecting product backlog
items from the top of the product backlog until the development team feels it has
enough work to fill the sprint. The development team should keep in mind its past
performance assessing its capacity for the new sprint, and use this as a guide line
of how much effort they can complete.
5.2.2 Agile in this project
The methodology chosen for this project will be based upon Scrum, but major modifica-
tions will have to be made, for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is no such development
team: a single developer will take care of the implementation of the project. Moreover,
there is no possibility of having a Scrum master either. The project director will take a
role between a technical coordinator and a product owner, although no real concept of
product exists in the project, either way.
5.2.2.1 Practices
The adopted Agile practices for this project include:
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• The usage of Trello5 as a task tracking tool, to prioritize them similarly to the
Scrum backlogs.
• Sprint-based development cycles with a sprint duration of one week.
• Constant (re)-evaluation of constraints and requirements, to forsee changes and
take preventive action (similar to retrospectives, but less formal and certainly
shorter).
5.2.2.2 Scope
Adopting Agile methodologies involves several decisions on how to manage the project
and its requirements. In this particular project, if we are to examine the classical
constraints (of which we talked about at the beginning of this chapter), we must be
aware that the schedule is fixed (perhaps not the planning, but the final milestone) and
this forces us to let the scope opened. This means that we will implement as much
features as we can, assessing their quality, but no feature list will drive the success or
failure of the project. Because we will be working on the basis of such an open scope,
deviations in this field are likely to happen. These, however, will not result in a project
failure in any case, because an agreement has been reached to work this way.
5.3 Schedule
The following subsections provide some details about the initial project planning (Sec-
tion 5.3.1), as well as the changes it has suffered over time (Section 5.3.2). There have
been significant deviations concerning the original project schedule. Not only the global
duration has been lengthened, but more phases have been layed out, as was needed. As
a positive contrast, early detection of such alterations has been sometimes possible.
5.3.1 Initial schedule
In this section, we cover the original analysis that was reported during the Project
Management module6, at the beginning of this project’s development.
5Its description, along with other resources and tools used, can be found on Section 5.4.1
6The Project Management module is a compulsory course that all students have to undertake when
beginning their Bachelor’s Degree Final Project, concerning project management concepts and tech-
niques, as well as documentation.
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5.3.1.1 Overall duration
Taking a general look at the project’s schedule, we can estimate it to have a total
duration of about 5 months. Even though it was registered on July, 2014, the project
did not begin until September, because August is the only month I can have holidays,
due to job restrictions. Considering the next possible project’s lecture shifts, we believe
that the one taking place in December is too close in time. Thus, the project will endure
until January the 26th, 2015. This should give us time enough to develop the project
and document it without too much pressure, which is key to fulfill one of the main
established goals: high quality results.
5.3.1.2 Schedule slack
The project schedule we present herein does not fill up the total amount of time available
- more than two weeks are left blank, with no assigned tasks. This is intended because
of the following reasons:
• The amount of time needed to develop the proposed algorithms is uncertain. It
is hard to estimate the time it may take, because I have no previous knowledge
on the area. Therefore, we opted for, in one hand, an open scope approach, and,
on the other, leaving a considerable time gap between the last planned task and
the project’s final milestone: its defense. Being conservative, if the development of
any proposed method is delayed, we still have some leeway to introduce schedule
changes, without risking the project’s success.
• We have estimated the project’s report confection and the defense presentation
rehearsals to be 35 and 7 days, respectively, but depending on how much develop-
ment is finally carried out, it might not be time enough to write down the report.
Extra time for doing it can be then borrowed from the schedule slack time.
5.3.1.3 Schedule monitoring & changes
For the development phase of the project, the most suitable way to monitor the schedule
we have found is applying an Agile approach to the process. We will work in one week
long sprints, meeting every week to assess the quality of the solutions, the proper progress
of the project and to plan what will be done during the following sprint.
Sprint planning meetings are where the main goals of the project will be sliced in small
tasks, which can be tracked and implemented better, because they are not so complex.
Thanks to this constant fine-grained planning process, schedule or scope deviations are
detected earlier and can be managed efficiently, reacting before they affect deeper the
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overall success of the project. Given that no fixed features list is assigned to each sprint
of the development phase, if the completion of either of those features is delayed, it can
be made to span for some more time.
Within each of the development sprints, burndown charts7 will be used to monitor the
progress of the sprint. These charts are helpful in identifying patterns of work (sprint-
end rushes, for example) and can help developers maintain a constant rate of finished
features.
Besides burndown charts and sprint planning meetings, the use of velocity charts will
also be helpful to increase the predictability of the following sprint plannings. The more
predictable they are, the less deviations will occur and the schedule will be more likely
to be fulfilled.
5.3.1.4 Project phases
The project is divided in 4 main phases, besides of the undertaking of the Project’s
Management module. Each phase has an estimated duration and a risk evaluation
in terms of schedule deviation. The amount of hours is an approximated calculation
from the number of days in each phase: 4 hours a day are estimated to be spent,
because I am currently working part-time and also taking some subjects. A more detailed
task granularity can be seen in the Gantt chart (on Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). Task
dependencies are shown in the chart too. Those phases, chronologically ordered are:
[Phase 1] Contextualization: it is intended to perform a deeper bibliographic research
and a study of the main subjects concerning the project, at the theory level -
no practical skills or technological research will be done.
• Duration estimation: 11 days (44 hours).
• Risk: this phase has a medium to high risk of being delayed, due to lack
of effective time (a wrong estimation), and also because more insight than
planned might be needed, consuming more time.
[Phase 2] Environment setup: during this phase, all necessary tools and material re-
sources will be gathered and configured. The concrete developing workflow will
be decided, too.
7A burn down chart is a graphical representation of work left to do versus time. The outstanding
work (or backlog) is often on the vertical axis, with time along the horizontal. That is, it is a run chart
of outstanding work. It is useful for predicting when all of the work will be completed. It is often used
in agile software development methodologies such as Scrum.
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• Duration estimation: 8 days (32 hours).
• Risk: this phase has a low risk of being delayed, because the technology
that is to be used is, a priori, well known to us.
[Phase 3] Development: all of this project coding will be performed during this phase.
As said before, a sprint methodology will be used during this phase, being one
week each.
• Duration estimation: with an initial planning of 7 sprints, 49 days will
be used (196 hours).
• Risk: there is a medium risk of this phase to be delayed. Even with the
use of Agile methodologies, if a fundamental feature was needed and there
was no more time left, another sprint (or at most a couple of them) could
be introduced, to finish the remaining tasks.
[Phase 4] Documentation: the project’s report will be written after the development
phase, along with any deployment documentation that was required and the
final presentation, which will also be rehearsed then.
• Duration estimation: 42 days (168 hours).
• Risk: this phase has a medium risk of being delayed too. Reviews of the
report will be made and writing in English might take up more time than
expected.
5.3.1.5 Detailed schedule: Gantt chart
A detailed Gantt chart of the schedule can be seen in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4. The
chart was generated with the Project management free software package, available online
on the Ubuntu 12.04 Software Center. Please note that there is no way the chart could
fit in a single page (not even if it was landscape).
Project management 37
GEP module 44d
Scope definition 5d
Project scheduling 5d
Budget management & feasibility 5d
Preliminar presentation 6d
State of the art & literature 5d
Specifications 9d
Final presentation & document 9d
Contextualization 14d
IT & Privacy 4d
Data mining 3d
PPDM 7d
Environment setup 8d
Workflow design 1d
MOA framework 7d
Development 49d
Sprint 1 7d
Planning 1d
Implementation 5d
Integration 1d
Sprint 2 7d
Planning 1d
Implementation 5d
Integration 1d
Sprint 3 7d
Planning 1d
Implementation 5d
Integration 1d
Sprint 4 7d
Planning 1d
Implementation 5d
Integration 1d
Sprint 5 7d
Planning 1d
Implementation 5d
Integration 1d
Sprint 6 7d
Planning 1d
Implementation 5d
Integration 1d
Sprint 7 7d
Planning 1d
Implementation 5d
Integration 1d
Documentation 43d
Project deployment & finalization 1d
Project report 35d
Presentation & rehearsal 7d
Project defense
Oct 2014 Nov 2014
Week 37 Week 38 Week 39 Week 40 Week 41 Week 42 Week 43 Week 44 Week 45 Week 46
Name Work
Figure 5.3: Initial project schedule Gantt chart (part 1).
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Dec 2014 Jan 2015 Feb 2015
Week 47 Week 48 Week 49 Week 50 Week 51 Week 52 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 We…
Figure 5.4: Initial project schedule Gantt chart (part 2).
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5.3.2 Schedule deviation
We will cover now the changes that have occurred in the schedule of the project and
analyze its causes.
5.3.2.1 Overall duration
The original total duration has been extended from 5 months to 8 months, approxi-
mately. Thus, the final report and its defence is now scheduled to be in April, which is
the next available lecture shift in the Faculty. We believe that this extended duration
will allow us to fulfill all requirements defined in the scope of the project.
5.3.2.2 Deviation analysis
There are several possible reasons behind this schedule deviation:
• The Project Management module lasted longer than expected, forcing the devel-
opment phase of the project to begin later.
• During the definition of the project initial schedule, we expected to begin devel-
oping it while the Project Management module endured, which was, definitely, a
planning error. Such tasks concurrency was not possible at that time.
• At the beginning of the development phase, we explored different technological
alternatives, before deciding which approach was mostly suited to our needs, but
this exploration delayed the actual development process for a couple of weeks.
• As was already stated in the Project Management report, some of the requested
features have posed to be more complicated than was expected, consuming some
more time than that assigned to them.
• For personal reasons, no work could be carried out during the Christmas vacations,
which lasted two more weeks, furtherly delaying the project’s development.
5.3.2.3 Current detailed schedule
Considering the previous analysis, a new Gantt chart has been built, with the new
project’s schedule, which is detailed in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.5: Final project schedule Gantt chart (part 1).
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Figure 5.6: Final project schedule Gantt chart (part 2).
Project management 42
5.4 Budget
The initial budget and resources analysis, performed during the Project Management
module, corresponds with Section 5.4.1, Section 5.4.2 and Section 5.4.3. Due to schedule
deviations during the project, a final budget estimation is given in Section 5.4.4.
The project’s budget is entirely based on an estimation of human, hardware and soft-
ware resources costs. No real income is perceived, besides the salary of the project’s
supervisor, who is a tenure-track lecturer at the Barcelona School of Informatics, and
an associate researcher at the Barcelona Supercomputing Center. No third parties are
involved in the project - no companies or organizations are providing any funds. More-
over, even though the work is to be integrated into the MOA framework, it is indeed
an open-source project, to which we will be contributing, meaning contributions are
expected from any kind of source, be it funded or not.
All other associated costs are externalized, either by people involved in the project or
by the university, where the development of the project will be held.
5.4.1 Resources & budget estimation
Resources consumed in this project only fall in one of the following categories: human
resources, hardware, software and other expenses. For a detailed description of what will
be needed in the project, please see the following subsections. It is important to keep in
mind that all resources will be consumed equally througout the entire project duration.
5.4.1.1 Human resources
Human resources are summarized in Table 5.1.
All expenses included here are related to people’s salaries. Only one developer will
be working on this project, but a number of hours involving supervision tasks is also
imputed to the project’s supervisor, so its corresponding cost is added too. Taxes are
included in all of the following items. The price is also an estimation: on the developer’s
side, it is based on a salaries comparison webpage (Glassdoor [30])8; on the supervisor
side, the price is based on his own estimation.
• Developer: an average of 20 hours a week are estimated, spanning for about 21
weeks, summing up a total of 420 hours.
8As of date 12th October, 2014, the average salary for a software engineer in Barcelona is 32000e
per year (including taxes). Considering 12 monthly instalments and an average of 160 hours per month,
this yields a total of 16.66e per hour.
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• Supervisor:
– Project’s take off: 8 hours, between meetings and initial planning.
– Sprints: 8 hours each sprint, taking into account both face to face meetings
and other supervising tasks. There are 7 sprints scheduled so far, making a
total of 56 hours.
– Documentation: during the project’s final stage, an estimation of 20 hours
is taken from the corresponding supervision of the project’s report.
Role Price (per hour) Working hours Total
Supervisor 35e 84 2940e
Developer 16.66e 420 6997.2e
Total 9937.2e
Table 5.1: Human resources associated costs. All taxes are included in the Price per
hour column.
5.4.1.2 Hardware resources
Hardware resources are summarized in Table 5.2.
All hardware needed resources are shown in the corresponding table. Their cost is
calculated by estimating its amortization, spanned over 5 years (it is a personal laptop).
To calculate its amortized cost per hour, we will take into account that this equipment
is used throughout the course too, and estimating that 2500 hours of work are carried
each year.
Product Price Units Amortized
price per hour
Work time (hours) Total
Asus k53sv 650e 1 0.052e 420 21.84e
Total 21.84e
Table 5.2: Hardware amortization costs. All taxes included.
5.4.1.3 Software resources
All software needed to undertake this project is free and, most of it, is open sourced.
Despite this, we will include a list of it here, to show what will be used at a finer grain.
• Ubuntu 12.04: operating system. Available at: http://www.ubuntu.com/download.
• Trello: online task management tool. Available at: https://trello.com/.
• Google Drive: online, collaborative office software suit, used to create burndown
charts (spreadsheets). Available at: https://drive.google.com.
Project management 44
• Java SDK: Java language Software Development Kit. Available at: http://
openjdk.java.net.
• Eclipse IDE: integrated development environment package. Available at: https:
//www.eclipse.org/home/index.php.
• Git: source version control system. Available at: http://git-scm.com/. Remote
code repositories will be hosted at GitHub (https://github.com) for free.
• MOA: Massive Online Analysis, a stream mining framework. Available at: http:
//moa.cms.waikato.ac.nz.
• LATEX: document preparation system. Available at: http://www.latex-project.
org.
5.4.1.4 Other expenses
All expenses not covered in the previous sections are detailed in Table 5.3.
Please note that the cost of each item of this section is an estimation. Moreover, even
though they are displayed, since no budget is really available, they will be absorbed by
the university, where most of the work will be carried out.
Product Price per month Months Total
Energy 35e 4 140e
Water 25e 4 100e
Heat & air 30e 4 120e
Internet connection 40e 4 160e
Total 520e
Table 5.3: Uncategorized resources estimated costs. All taxes are included.
5.4.2 Total budget estimation
The sum of the subtotals of the previous sections is shown in Table 5.4. Please note
that, since taxes are already included in each item appropriately, there is no need to add
them here.
Concept Total
Human resources 9937.2e
Hardware 21.84e
Software 0e
Other expenses 520e
Total 10479.04e
Table 5.4: Total budget: summation of budget estimations.
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All costs are just estimations and are not covered in any way, with the exception of
the supervisor’s salary. This means that, in fact, there is no possible way this project
is feasible. However, given that the developer has no salary at all and that all other
extra costs are assumed by the university or the developer, the project can be developed
normally.
5.4.3 Budget control mechanisms
Any budget deviations related to material equipment or software purchases will be mon-
itored in the sprint planning meetings at the beginning of each of those phases during
the project. These possible extra costs will be assumed by the developer, since no other
source of funds is available.
Another source of budget deviations can be found on the project’s duration. If the
schedule is not fulfilled and the project is delayed, extra cost in terms of human resources,
hardware amortizations and other expenses would have to be added. They still would be
treated as they are in the present analysis, meaning no significant change would occur.
5.4.4 Final budget estimation
Due to the deviation in the project’s schedule, that was already analyzed in Section 5.3.2,
an increment in the human resources, external expenses and hardware amortization bud-
get contributions has arised. It is important to note that, given that no proprietary soft-
ware package has been used, no additional costs might be derived from the lenghtening
of the project duration. We will now cover this budget deviation and provide a final
estimation of the project cost, which is summarized in Table 5.8.
Human resources: deviation
Following the analysis from 5.4.1, we just have to add the corresponding increment of
working hours for both the developer and supervisor.
• Developer: an average of 20 hours a week are estimated, spanning for about 32
weeks, summing up a total of 640 hours. However, given that no work was carried
during Christmas holidays, the total number of hours should be lowered to, at
most, 600 hours.
• Supervisor:
– Project’s take off: 8 hours, between meetings and initial planning.
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– Sprints: 8 hours each sprint, taking into account both face to face meetings
and other supervising tasks. With 10 sprints of final work, this yields a total
of 80 hours.
– Documentation: during the project’s final stage, an estimation of 20 hours
is taken from the corresponding supervision of the project’s report.
Considering the previous estimation and keeping the same prices per hour of the initial
estimation, the following total human resources cost is calculated (see Table 5.5).
Role Price (per hour) Working hours Total
Supervisor 35e 108 3780e
Developer 16.66e 600 9996e
Total 13776e
Table 5.5: Human resources associated costs (final estimation).
Hardware resources: deviation
The only change in the hardware related costs is the number of working hours devoted
to the project, which have a direct impact on the amortization of the equipment.
Product Price Units Amortized
price per hour
Work time (hours) Total
Asus k53sv 650e 1 0.052e 600 31.2e
Total 31.2e
Table 5.6: Hardware amortization costs (final estimation).
Other expenses: deviation
Given that the amount of months dedicated to the project’s development has increased,
the estimated cost for the expenses related to the developer’s accomodation has to reflect
the changes as well.
Product Price per month Months Total
Energy 35e 7 245e
Water 25e 7 175e
Heat & air 30e 7 210e
Internet connection 40e 7 280e
Total 910e
Table 5.7: Uncategorized resources estimated costs. All taxes are included.
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Final estimation
The following is the final estimation of the project’s budget, taking into account all
deviations from the particular budget contributions.
Concept Total
Human resources 13776e
Hardware 31.2e
Software 0e
Other expenses 910e
Total 14717.2e
Table 5.8: Total budget final estimation.
Chapter 6
Implementing the filters
We will cover now the results of the main development phase of the project, concerning
the implementation of the MOA privacy preserving filters and the design decisions taken
for each of them.
6.1 Alternatives exploration
The Massive Online Analysis stream mining framework is built in the Java language, thus
providing some benefits in terms of portability, ease of maintenance and development,
but also exposing some drawbacks, mainly due to the lack of easily parallelizable code,
like is the case with C or Fortran by using the OpenMP1 language extensions. Given the
language enforcement MOA imposes and the existence of well-known SDC toolsuites, like
the sdcMicro R package (reviewed in Section 3.2), an analysis of possible alternatives
was taken during the first weeks of the project’s development phase.
6.1.1 sdcMicro & Java
The most direct alternative, besides actually implementing the filters, was to use the
sdcMicro library to perform the necessary calculations over the streaming data origi-
nated in MOA and take the results back to the framework. This approach can be better
understood in Figure 6.1: a bi-directional connection between the Java runtime (the
Java Virtual Machine or JVM) and the R process would be needed to be able to use the
SDC methods of the sdcMicro library. The results of the exploratory analysis of this
type of solution are summarized in Table 6.1.
1OpenMP (Open Multi-Processing) is a programming interface that supports multi-platform shared
memory multiprocessing programming in C, C++, and Fortran. It consists of a set of compiler directives,
library routines, and environment variables that influence run-time behavior. [31]
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R
MOA (Java)
Privacy Filters
Data Processing
(Machine Learning)
sdcMicro
data 
knowledge 
Figure 6.1: R/Java hybrid solution using the sdcMicro package.
This interconnection could be achieved by using some existing technologies that perform
the inter-process communication based on different approaches:
• rJava/JRI: the rJava and JRI counterparts are a couple of libraries designed to
provide low-level communication between the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and
an R process. rJava provides a low-level bridge between R and Java via the Java
Native Interface (JNI)2. It allows to create objects, call methods and access fields
of Java objects from R [33]. On the other side, JRI is a Java/R Interface, which
allows to run R inside Java applications as a single thread. Basically, it loads R
dynamic library into Java and provides a Java API to R functionality [34].
• Rserve: it is a TCP/IP server which allows other programs to use facilities of R
from various languages without the need to initialize R or link against an R library.
A typical use is to integrate R backend for computation of statstical models, plots
etc. in other applications [35].
Due to performance related to networking protocols against native interface communi-
cation, Rserve was discarded as an option to implement filters for MOA: a streaming
environment requires the maximum throughput possible for its algorithms and, thus,
the overhead associated with TCP-based IPC is considered to be excessive.
2The Java Native Interface is a standard programming interface for writing Java native methods and
embedding the Java Virtual Machine into native applications. The primary goal is binary compatibility
of native method libraries across all Java virtual machine implementations on a given platform [32].
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Benefits Drawbacks
Faster development No algorithms are indeed developed
Easily extensible Strong dependencies
SDC methods are right Depends on external installed software
Needs system libraries to work
Maintanability is harder
Reduced performance due to marshalling
Table 6.1: Evaluation of the R/Java hybrid solution.
Anyway, either of such solutions imply that marshalling and unmarshalling techniques
would have to be applied, in order to transform the data structures that are differently
used by R and Java. Moreover, even though that no SDC algorithm would need to be
implemented, the interconnect code would not be easy to maintain.
Finally, there is another important argument against the R/Java hybrid approach: its
strong reliance in external dependencies. These dependencies not only make the instal-
lation of the SDC-enabled MOA framework more difficult, but are directly linked to
third-party software and system libraries, making the environment less stable and ro-
bust, from the software user point of view. These dependencies are shown in Figure 6.2
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Figure 6.2: JRI based R/Java hybrid solution architechture: strong dependencies.
6.1.1.1 Renjin
Yet another altenative was explored that was meant to interconnect MOA with the
sdcMicro package: the Renjin project [36]. Renjin is a JVM-based interpreter for the
R language: all computations of any R package can be executed upon the JVM, instead
of a separate R process. This way, the dependency that this project could have had on
R and some system libraries disappeared. However, it is worth noting that, even with
Renjin, data structures conversion would have to be performed, rendering its use as
impractical as the use of the JRI library. Moreover, the sdcMicro package was still not
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available in its JVM port at the time of the evaluation due to some internal dependencies
and errors, and we could not wait for it to be solved.
6.1.2 Chosen alternative
As a simple remark, the final decision was to actually develop the filters for the MOA
framework by extending it, in the form of a pure Java implementation.
6.2 MOA & Privacy Filters
Notation: from now on, a text stylized with a monospaced font like this example will
refer to an actual programming artifact: a variable, class, file name, etc.
We have already showed along this report that filters are a feature of the MOA frame-
work. Filters are, actually, a particular form of stream. Whenever a filter should be
applied to a stream to perform a posterior analysis, a FilteredStream3 is built. This
class takes a generic Stream object as the input stream and a list of StreamFilters,
which are also Streams, if we examine their type hierarchy. Taking advantage of the ex-
istence of both the FilteredStream and StreamFilter classes, we can begin designing
the privacy filters that will implement the actual SDC methods.
6.2.1 PrivacyFilter
Thanks to the object-oriented capabilities of the Java language, we can design and
implement a generic abstract data type for all proposed SDC algorithms. By doing so,
we will be able to centralize some of the common logic behind them. The abstract type
of the privacy filters is the PrivacyFilter class. An incomplete UML diagram of the
specification of this class and its most relevant parent types can be seen in Figure 6.4.
Concerning the responsibility4 of this class, there is a main task that the PrivacyFilter
is meant to address: the measurement or evaluation of the disclosure risk (DR) and
the information loss (IL). The approach is to let the SDC method (the concrete sub-
class) anonymize the instances5 of the stream and collect them, along with the original
instances that have been processed. The evaluation of both magnitudes, DR and IL,
3All documentation of the MOA API can be found on http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/~abifet/MOA/
API/index.html
4In object-oriented programming, the single responsibility principle states that every class should have
responsibility over a single part of the functionality provided by the software, and that responsibility
should be entirely encapsulated by the class (Martin [37]).
5In the MOA context, records in a dataset (in a stream) are called instances and are represented
using the Instance interface.
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is performed by estimators using these pairs of instances (see Estimators, below). The
mechanism is best understood with the schematic presented in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: A schematic of the tasks performed by the PrivacyFilter class, showing
the stream data flow.
Implementation details
The PrivacyFilter class is, by construction, an InstanceStream and a StreamFilter
(see Figure 6.4) but also, and most importantly, an AnonymizationFilter. This last
interface, which the PrivacyFilter implements, allows to encapsulate all privacy-
preserving behaviour in a single module.
The most important of the methods defined in the AnonymizationFilter type is
nextAnonymizedInstancePair() : InstancePair
which is left to be implemented (it is abstract at the PrivacyFilter level) by any
subclass. This way, we can use inversion of control6 to force a subtype define the
concrete behaviour of the function, while still conforming to a precise contract. The
InstancePair returned by this abstract method is just a pair structure containing both
the original and anonymized instances that should be streamed next. If we say that x
is an instance and x′ its anonymized counterpart, the InstancePair class would simply
be the tuple 〈x, x′〉.
Estimators
The estimators used by the PrivacyFilter class are desgined to be modular and, most
of all, easily modifiable: they are just interfaces defining a contract that all estimators
6The Hollywood principle or inversion of control pattern is a software design methodology that takes
its name from the cliche´ response given to amateurs auditioning in Hollywood: ”Don’t call us, we’ll
call you”. It is a useful paradigm that assists in the development of code with high cohesion and low
coupling that is easier to debug, maintain and test.
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«interface»
InstanceStream
+ getHeader() : InstancesHeader
+ estimatedRemainingInstances() : Integer
+ hasMoreInstances() : Boolean
+ nextInstance() : Instance
+ isRestartable() : Boolean
+ restart()
«interface»
AnonymizationFilter
+ nextAnonimizedInstancePair() : InstancePair
+ prepareFilterForUse()
+ restartFilter()
«abstract»
AbstractStreamFilter
# inputStream : InstanceStream
+ restartImpl()
«interface»
StreamFi l ter
+ setInputStream(stream : InstanceStream)
«abstract»
AbstractOptionHandler
«abstract»
PrivacyFilter
+ disclosureRiskEstimatorOption : ClassOption
+ informationLossEstimatorOption : ClassOption
- disclosureRiskEstimator : DisclosureRiskEstimator
- informationLossEstimator : InformationLossEstimator
+ getDisclosureRiskEstimator() : DisclosureRiskEstimator
+ getInformationLossEstimator() : InformationLossEstimator
+ getEvaluation() : Evaluation
+ getCurrentInformationLoss() : Double
+ getIncrementalInformationLoss() : Double
+ getCurrentDisclosureRisk() : Double
Figure 6.4: UML class diagram of the relevant types in the PrivacyFilter class
hierarchy. Notice that not all the involved types are shown.
must implement. The methods belonging to such contracts can be seen in Figure 6.5
(the concrete estimators implementation is explained in Section 6.3). Again, there is
one particular method that is most important in the estimators context:
performEstimationForInstances(instancePair : InstancePair)
This method is the generic way for the PrivacyFilter to feed the estimators with
〈x, x′〉 tuples (InstancePairs). The estimators have the responsibility of performing
the necessary calculations using this stream of pairs of instances.
«interface»
DisclosureRiskEstimator
+ getCurrentDisclosureRisk() : Double
«interface»
InformationLossEstimator
+ getCurrentInformationLoss() : Double
+ getIncrementalInformationLoss() : Double
«interface»
FilterEstimator
+ performEstimationForInstances(instancePair : InstancePair)
Figure 6.5: Class diagram of the FilterEstimator type hierarchy.
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moa
streams
filters
privacy
differentialprivacy
laplace
microaggregation
est imators
disclosurerisk
informationloss
microaggregation
noiseaddition
rankswapping
uti ls
tasks
Figure 6.6: Package organization of the privacy filters. New packages (not existing
in the MOA framework) are shown in bold. Existing packages that have been extended
with new types are shown in italics.
Finally, the DR and IL estimators used by a PrivacyFilter can be configured at runtime
by setting the appropriate options7 of the filter.
6.2.2 Filters ecosystem
Having reviewed the basic PrivacyFilter generic type, we can now provide a couple
of figures that introduce the final structure of the privacy filters class ecosystem. The
package encapsulation of the methods can be seen on Figure 6.6. An incomplete8 class
diagram of the filters is shown in Figure 6.7.
6.3 Estimators
We have implemented a pair of disclosure risk and information loss estimators, con-
forming to the corresponding interfaces described in Figure 6.5. These concrete imple-
mentations are the default estimators of the PrivacyFilter, but can be configured as
necessary, being able to plug in different methods.
7The MOA framework makes extensive use of configurable options, which can be set either on a
command line execution or via the GUI that MOA provides.
8Most of the classes shown in the diagram depend on others for their internal implementation, but,
for the sake of concreteness, they are not shown, as are not relevant for the purpose of this report.
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«abstract»
AbstractOptionHandler
«interface»
StreamFi l ter
MADPFil ter
SSEEstimator BufferedIndividualRecordLinker
«interface»
AnonymizationFilter
inputStream
«interface»
FilterEstimator
«interface»
DisclosureRiskEstimator
«interface»
InformationLossEstimator
«abstract»
AbstractStreamFilter
RankSwappingFilterNoiseAdditionFilter MicroaggregationFil ter
«interface»
InstanceStream
«abstract»
PrivacyFilter
Figure 6.7: Class diagram of the privacy filters ecosystem. Only the relevant types
are shown and no method or member specifications have been included.
6.3.1 BufferedIndividualRecordLinker
The disclosure risk estimator, called BufferedIndividualRecordLinker, uses a distance-
based record linkage approach (see Section 2.2.3.1) to estimate the risk of records re-
identification.
The estimator holds a buffer W , thus its name, of the last b original instances, this is,
non-anonymized records, with size |W | = b as an input parameter. Each time that a
〈x, x′〉 pair is passed in to the estimator, it adds the original instance x to the buffer,
deletes the oldest seen one, and performs a record linkage trying to re-identify x′ with
any instance in the buffer.
The re-identification works as follows: for each instance wi, with 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, we store
it a set G if its distance to x′ is the minimum one recorded, named δ. Whenever an
instance is found at distance d < δ, all the instances are removed from G and both this
set and δ are updated accordingly. At the end of the buffer traversal, the target original
instance is checked to see if it is in the set G. The linkage probability for an anonymized
instance x′ is calculted as
P (x′) =
0 if x /∈ G1
|G| if x ∈ G
(6.1)
Being X the set of all the instances already processed and |X| = n, the disclosure risk
is estimated in a [0, 1] range as
DR =
∑
x∈X P (x
′)
n
(6.2)
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Finally, the distance measure used in the estimator follows a modification of the Eu-
clidean distance which also takes into account categorical variables. It is best explained
with the pseudo-code representation shown in Procedure 6.1.
Procedure distance(x,y)
Data: x, y instances
Result: the distance measure, d
begin
d← 0;
for i ∈ attributes(x) do
if isNumeric(i) then
d← d+ (xi − yi)2;
else
if xi 6= yi then
d← d+ 1;
d← √d;
return d;
end
6.3.2 SSEEstimator
The information loss estimator implemented as a default for the PrivacyFilter class
uses an unbounded approach (see Section 2.2.4) to measure the amount of useful infor-
mation that is lost with the application of such privacy filters.
The aim of the implementation given in this project is to provide a way to compare
the diverse privacy filters, this is, we do not intend to achieve a reliable and precise IL
measurement. Therefore, the estimation is simply based on the sum of square errors or
SSE between the original and anonymized instances, x and x′, respectively. If we call X
to the set of original instances already processed and X ′ to its anoymized counterparts,
the SSE is calculated as
SSE =
∑
x∈X
∑
x′∈X′
(dist(x, x′))2 (6.3)
where the distance metric used is the same that was defined for the DR estimator
in Section 6.3.1 (see Procedure 6.1). The main drawback in using this approach, besides
it being more difficult to make comparisons due to not being a bounded measure, is that
categorical attributes are overweighted, thus distorting the validity of the estimation.
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6.4 NoiseAdditionFilter
The uncorrelated noise addition mechanism that was reviewed in Section 2.3.1 to protect
microdata is implemented in the NoiseAdditionFilter class. Given the low level of
data protection that this family of algorithms are capable of [38], we have not imple-
mented any further sofistication, such as estimating correlated noise or using (non)-linear
transformations to obtain it.
6.4.1 Design
The NoiseAdditionFilter adds uncorrelated noise to the values of the attributes of an
instance x, whether they are numerical or categorical. This is achieved using an array
of observers, one for each variable. If an attribute is numerical, its associated observer
is a GaussianEstimator, an existing class in the MOA framework that allows us to
incrementally (thus best suited to streaming data) estimate the properties of a gaussian
distributed variable: the mean µ and the variance σ2 (or standard deviation, if desired).
On the other hand, for each categorical attribute, its observer stores a set of all the
different values that previously processed instances had.
The filter has two input parameters: a and c, both real numbers in the [0, 1] range,
which act as a scaling factor of the noise being applied to attributes and to the class
variable, respectively.
We denote by xi the value of the i-th attribute of the instance x and by x
′
i its masked
(distorted) counterpart. For a numeric variable, the noisy values are calculated as
x′i = xi + β · σ ·  (6.4)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is one of the input parameters a or c, σ is the standard deviation
estimate, obtained from the attribute’s GaussianEstimator observer and, finally,  is
drawn from a gaussian random variable ε ∼ N(0, 1).
For a categorical variable i, its value for a given instance, xi, is replaced by another value
x′i ∈ Range(i). Given that MOA encodes the values of categorical attributes as natural
numbers, we can simply select x′i from a uniform discrete random variable bound to the
range of the attribute as it is estimated by its observer. In order to preserve the scale
of the amount of noise being added, this replacement only takes place if  < β, with β
being either the a or c parameter and  drawn from a random variable ε ∼ N(0, 1).
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Finally, because no complex processing is needed to implement this filter, its computa-
tional cost bounded by O(n), with n being the number of instances anonymized by the
algorithm.
6.4.2 Summary
The NoiseAdditionFilter implements an uncorrelated noise addition scheme to the
instances of the filtered stream. Table 6.2 summarizes the main properties of the filter.
NoiseAdditionFilter
Parameters a, c scaling factors of the noise added for attributes and class variable
Type of data Heterogeneous (both numeric and categorical attributes)
Cost O(n)
Table 6.2: NoiseAdditionFilter summary.
6.5 MicroAggregationFilter
The MicroAggregationFilter class is an implementation of the microaggregation SDC
method that was reviewed in Section 2.3.2. It is one of the best performing filters in
terms of both speed and disclosure risk versus information loss trade off.
6.5.1 Design
There are three main issues that are involved in the design of the microaggregation filter:
the need of a sliding window and the partition and aggregation steps.
6.5.1.1 Buffered filter
The first issue to address when designing the microaggregation implementation was the
adaptation of existing well-known algorithms to a streaming environment. It is obvious
that no partition can be made by just processing a single instance at a time: we need
some kind of historical knowledge of the previous or future records that the algorithm
will process in order to cluster them into groups. Given that MOA uses a sliding window
(see Section 2.1.1) technique to perform most of the machine learning tasks, we decided
to follow the same approach: we use a historical instance buffer to perform the partition
and aggregation steps. We say that it is historical, because it holds the last b instances
of the stream, being b ∈ N+ an input parameter.
Because the contract defined in the AnonymizationFilter interface requires that the
result of an anonymization step is a pair of an original and an anonymized instances, it
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is not the only buffer we need. Therefore, a second vector is used to hold the actually
modified instances. A third list (containing boolean values) is used to control which of
the instances in the buffers have been already anonymized.
We say that a MOA filter implementation of an SDC method using this processing
scheme (a sliding window) is a buffered filter.
Notation: from now on, when discussing implementaiton details of buffered filters, we
will use the following notation and symbols:
• The original instances buffer is named W and has length |W | = b 9 By wi, we
denote the i-th instance stored in the buffer, being w0 the oldest one and wb−1 the
most recently added.
• The anonymized instance buffer is named W ′ and has the same length than the
previous buffer: |W ′| = b. The i-th instance of the buffer is denoted by w′i.
• For convenience, A denotes the set of already anonymized instances. A generic
instance x is said to be anonymized if x ∈ A.
• The value of the j-th attribute of an instance wi is denoted as wij .
• Named instances are those that are denoted using greek letters: τ, σ, ρ. These
instances must be named by explicitly denoting which position they are in a buffer;
for example: τ ← w0.
• The value of the j-th attribute of a named instance is denoted as τj , for example.
Notice that, since a named instance is already well defined in terms of its position
in the buffer, a single subscript index is needed to reference an attribute.
• The instance to be anonymized is called the target and is always referred to by a
the named instance τ .
Procedure 6.2 shows the common implementation of the nextAnonymizedInstancePair()
abstract method (defined in the AnonymizationFilter interface) for any buffered fil-
ter: the buffer is filled with instances of the input stream S and, if the target in-
stance (τ = w0) has not already been processed, its anonymization is requested via the
processNextInstance() method. After this procedure has been called, the instance
9The size of the historical buffer is a common parameter to all buffered filters.
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pair 〈x, x′〉 is built, the target instance is removed from all necessary buffers and the
tuple is returned.
Procedure nextAnonymizedInstancePair(void)
Data: buffers W,W ′, A and stream S
Result: an instance pair 〈x, x′〉
begin
while S.hasMoreInstances() and |W | < b− 1 do
s← S.nextInstance();
W ←W ∪ s;
W ′ ←W ′ ∪ s;
x← w0;
if x /∈ A then
processNextInstance();
x′ ← w′0;
W ←W − {w0};
W ′ ←W ′ − {w′0};
A← A− {x};
return 〈x, x′〉;
end
6.5.1.2 Partition
Concerning the clustering step of microaggregation, we have seen that the MDAV
and µ-Approx algorithms are best suited to achieve the lowest information loss pos-
sible (see Section 2.3.2), but a more thorough evaluation forced us to discard them as
they are rather too computationally complex, given the streaming context we are in.
Domingo-Ferrer et al. [20] show that both methods (MDAV and µ-Approx) are bounded
to a O(n2) complexity time, where n is the number of records (instances) processed.
With such a high cost, a sensible implementation would do the clustering step just once,
when the window was full of instances, thus getting a complete partition (all instances
would belong to a cluster.) and then returning the whole window as a block. This is,
no real streaming scheme would be used; instead, we would be doing block processing.
Our proposal is to use a k-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) algorithm to continuously par-
tition the sliding window and be able to provide anonymized instances much faster, by
building just one cluster each time a new instance is requested to the filter. The records
in this single cluster are then aggregated and the target instance is returned. The com-
putational cost of this approach is quite lower than that of the MDAV and µ-Approx
heuristics, as long as the sliding window size remains relatively small.
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Figure 6.8: k-Nearest Neighbours based microaggregation schematic of a whole pro-
cessing step (from time t = 5 to t = 6). The target instance at the top of the buffer
(position 0) is anonymized by aggregating the values of its attributes with the other
instances of the cluster, highlighted with a gray background. Afterwards, it is flushed
out of the buffer and a new instance is received.
The idea of this partition procedure, formally explained in Algorithm 6.3, is to calculate,
for all instances not yet anonymized, the distance to the target (τ), keeping track of the
k − 1 nearest ones. If an instance is closer than the current furthest, the latter is
removed from the cluster and the former is added. At the end of the buffer traversal,
together with τ , the instances that have been kept will form the next cluster of the
stream partition. The distance metric used is the same than that used by the default
disclosure risk estimator (see Section 6.3.1 and Procedure 6.1).
The KNN algorithm uses a priority queue10 to hold the k− 1 nearest neighbours to the
target, τ . The queue works over distance-instance pairs 〈d, i〉, but is actually indexed
by d, holding the greatest value on the top of the queue. This way, it is very cheap
(constant time) to know whether a given instance x is closer than the current furthest
instance from τ . Insertions are also cheap, with an upper bound cost of O(log(k)).
The overall cost of the procedure, when implemented with a priority queue, depends on
the amount of instances n being processed, the size b of the sliding window and the size
k of the clusters and its upper bound is O(n · b · log(k)).
10A max-heap is used to keep the greatest element on top of the queue.
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Algorithm 6.3: KNN-based Clustering
Data: W ′, A
Result: a cluster C of k instances
begin
τ ← w′0;
C ← ∅ ∪ τ ;
Q← PriorityQueue〈DistanceInstancePair〉();
for x ∈W ′, x /∈ A do
d← dist(x, τ);
p← DistanceInstancePair(d, x);
if |Q| < k then
Q← Q ∪ p;
else
if p < Q.peek().distance() then
Q.poll();
Q← Q ∪ p;
for q ∈ Q do
C ← C ∪ q.instance();
return C;
end
6.5.1.3 Aggregation
After a cluster has been obtained from the previous partition step, the instances of the
cluster are aggregated, this is, the values of their attributes are imputed with the values
of the centroid of the cluster. For each attribute, the arithmetic mean (in the case that
the attribute is numeric) or the mode (if the attribute is nominal) are calculated over
the instances of the cluster. We do not provide any figure or algorithm concerning this
step, due its simplicity.
The computational cost of the aggregation step is directly related to the size k of the
clusters and can be approximated to Θ(n · 2 ·m · k), where n is the number of instances
processed and m is the number of attributes. This is: for each of the m attributes, a
first traversal over the k instances in the cluster is done to compute the averages and a
second one to impute the values of the centroid found. If we add together both steps,
we found the total cost of the algorithm: O(n · (b · log(k) + 2 ·m · k)). However, given
that m  n and k  b, n, the overall cost of this microaggregation implementation is
actually dominated by the cost of the clustering step: O(n · b · log(k)).
6.5.2 Summary
The MicroAggregationFilter implements a microaggregation algorithm based on a
KNN clustering for the partition step and a basic centroid aggregation scheme. Fig-
ure 6.9 shows a complete execution for a given target instance and Table 6.3 summarizes
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the main properties of this SDC method.
Figure 6.9: KNN-based microaggregation (k = 3, b = 16). Firstly, the target instance
(black) is not anonymized (a). Distances to the remaining non-anonymized instances are
calculated (b) and a cluster is formed with the k−1 nearest ones (c). After aggregating
the records in the cluster, the target instance is streamed out, a new instance (grey) is
received and a new target is selected (d).
MicroAggregationFilter
Parameters k (cluster size), b (buffer size)
Type of data Heterogeneous (both numeric and categorical attributes)
Cost O(n · b · log(k))
Table 6.3: MicroAggregationFilter summary.
6.6 RankSwappingFilter
The rank swapping SDC method described in Section 2.3.3 is implemented by the
RankSwappingFilter class. We must notice that it is a very na¨ıve implementation and
certainly not the fastest of the filters. As we will discuss later, future work is needed to
enhance the performance of this filter.
6.6.1 Design
The RankSwappingFilter is the second buffered filter that has been implemented in this
project (see Section 6.5.1.1). Almost the same data structures (the W , W ′ and A buffers)
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Figure 6.10: Rank swapping algorithm schematic. Two attributes of the target record
(position 0) have already been rank swapped with other values from instances in the
buffer. The variable being now processed is highlighted.
Figure 6.11: Rank swap of a single attribute for a target instance τ . First, the non
already swapped values of the attribute are filtered from the instances in the buffer W
(b) and are ranked, i.e., sorted (c). A maximum swap range is calculated using the p
parameter (d) and a value within this range is selected to perform the swap (e). Finally,
the vector of values is returned in the original order they were in the buffer (f).
used by the MicroAggregationFilter are used by the rank swapping algorithm. The
main difference with respect to the microaggregation algorithm is that the set A, used
to know whether or not an instance has already been anonymized, is now used to know
whether or not a value w′ij (this is, the j-th attribute value of the i-th instance in W
′)
has been swapped or not. Summarizing, we say that w′ij has been swapped if w
′
ij ∈ A.
The design of this SDC method follows almost exactly the explanation given in the
theoretical background chapter (Section 2.3.3): for each instance processed from the
stream, values of each variable j are ranked in ascending order, this is, they are sorted.
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Each ranked value is then swapped with another ranked value, randomly chosen within
a restricted range, controlled by the input parameter p, which denotes that swapped
values cannot differ more than p% of the total number of records. A more formal
description of its implementation is given in Algorithm 6.4, along with its auxiliar pro-
cedure selectSwap() (see Procedure 6.5). Also, a more visual explanation is shown
in Figure 6.11.
Algorithm 6.4: Rank Swapping
Data: W ′, A, p
Result: the target instance τ is anonymized
begin
τ ← w′0;
for j ∈ attributes(τ) do
γ ← selectSwap(W ′, p, j);
σ ← w′γ ;
swap(τj , σj);
A← A ∪ τj ∪ σj ;
end
Procedure selectSwap(W ′, p, j)
Data: W ′ buffer, p parameter and j attribute
Result: the index γ of the instance with which the swap will be done
begin
V ← Vector({〈w′ij , i〉 | 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, w′ij /∈ A});
// Notice that, by construction, 〈τj , 0〉 ∈ V
V ∗ ← sort(V ) // sort by value, not by index
t← V ∗.index(〈τj , 0〉);
r ← 1 + Random.uniform() mod (p · b / 100) // r ∈ [1, p% · b]
s← 0;
if t+ r < V ∗.size() then
s← t+ r;
else
s← V ∗.size()− 1;
// s is the index of the selected value-index pair to be swapped
〈·, γ〉 ← V ∗[s];
return γ;
end
If we examine the previous rank swapping algorithm in detail, we can estimate its
computational complexity. The cost of swapping a value of an attribute is, basically,
that of sorting all of its values: O(b · log(b)), where b is the size of the buffers W and W ′.
Each of the n instances of the stream will have its m attributes rank swapped with those
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of another record; therefore, the total complexity of the algorithm can be approximated
to be O(n ·m · b · log(b)).
6.6.2 Summary
The RankSwappingFilter class implements rank swapping algorithm to anonymize
streaming data by exchanging values of the same attribute between close instances. Ta-
ble 6.4 summarizes the main properties of this SDC method.
RankSwappingFilter
Parameters p (maximum swap range, as a percentage of the buffer size), b (buffer size)
Type of data Heterogeneous (both numeric and categorical attributes)
Cost O(n ·m · b · log(b))
Table 6.4: RankSwappingFilter summary.
6.7 DifferentialPrivacyFilter
The concept of differential privacy is introduced in Section 2.2.5.4 and on Section 2.3.4
a data release mechanism that achieves this privacy guarantee is described: the Laplace
mechanism. The drawback of differential privacy is that its definition relies on an in-
teractive query-response environment, which is definitely not the one we encounter in
stream data mining. However, we can find in the literature some efforts to bring differen-
tial privacy to non-interactive settings, such as in Leoni [21] and Soria-Comas et al. [14].
The DifferentialPrivacyFilter is devised to provide a differentialy private release
method in such a setting, namely, in the context of MOA privacy filters.
6.7.1 Design
Following the idea presented in Soria-Comas et al. [14], we have built an SDC method
which combines microaggregation with the Laplace mechanism. We recall now the defi-
nition of this mechanism:
Definition 6.1. (Laplace mechanisnm)
Given a dataset X and a function f : X → Rd, with w ∈ N+, an ε-differential privacy
mechanism M for releasing f is to publish
M(X) = f(X) + L
where L is a vector of d random variables each drawn from a Laplace distribution
Lap(0, ∆(f)ε ).
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We must remember that the amount of noise introduced by the addition of L to the
application of f depends on the sensitivity of f , denoted by ∆(f), this is, the maximum
variation in the result of f when computed over two neighbour datasets, i.e., sets differing
in at most one record. For a fixed ε, the higher the sensitivity of f , the more noise is
added.
Let Ir(X) be the function that returns the attribute values corresponding to the r-th
record (instance) of a stream X, this is, the “identity” function that returns instances
from a stream. It is clear that Ir, formally defined as
I : X × N+ → Rd
(X, r) 7→ (xr1, xr2, ..., xrd)
(6.5)
where d ∈ N+, X a dataset and r ∈ N, is a good candidate to be fed into the Laplace
mechanism to obtain an ε-differential private data release method.
The idea is now to compose Ir with a microaggregation function M , this is, Ir ◦M in
order to reduce the sensitivity of the results, thus increasing the analytical utility of
data released by the mechanism M(X) = (Ir ◦M)(X) + L. If we are able to lower the
sensitivity of the function captured by the Laplace mechanism, the information loss due
to the noise added will also be lower.
As we will see in Section 6.7.1.3, the DifferentialPrivacyFilter implements the
mechanism M described in the previous paragraph using the Ir ◦M composition.
6.7.1.1 Insensitive microaggregation
Soria-Comas et al. [14] prove that, by using an insensitive microaggregation function M ,
the global sensitivity of its composition with Ir is ∆(Ir ◦M) ≤ ∆(Ir)/k, being k the
minimum size of the clusters returned by M . The condition that such an insensitive
algorithm must fulfill is:
Definition 6.2. (Insensitive microaggregation [14])
Let X be a dataset, M a microaggregation algorithm, and let {C1, ..., Cn} be the set
of clusters that result from running M on X. Let X∗ be a neighbour dataset of X,
differing in a single record, and {C∗1 , ..., C∗n} the clusters that result from running M on
X∗. We say that M is insensitive to the input data if there is a bijection between the set
of clusters {C1, ..., Cn} and the set of clusters {C∗1 , ..., C∗n} such that each corresponding
pair of clusters differs at most in a single record.
Microaggregation algorithms are, however, very sensitive to the input data, this is,
concerning the previous definition, they mostly do not accomplish it, because a minimum
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change in a single record can cause the generation of completely different clusters. In
order to correct this behaviour, Soria-Comas et al. [14] prove that the design of an
insensitive microaggregation algorithm is possible by using a an order relation consistent
distance metric in the partition step.
Definition 6.3. (Order relation consistent distance [14])
A distance function d : X ×X → R is said to be consistent with a order relation ≤X if
d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) whenever x ≤X y ≤X z.
One way to achieve such a consistent distance function is to define a total order relation
among the elements of a dataset X as follows: given a reference point R ∈ X, for a pair of
elements x, y ∈ X, we say that x ≤ y if d(R, x) ≤ d(R, y), where d is a function such that
d : Dom(X)×Dom(X)→ R (the Euclidean distance between records of X, for example).
Furthermore, in order to increase the within-cluster homogeneity (see Section 2.3.2), this
reference point R should be located at the boundaries of Dom(X).
6.7.1.2 Sensitivity estimation
In the previous section, we discussed how to achieve a reduction in the sensitivity of Ir
by composing it with an insensitive microaggregation function such that the following
result holds: ∆(Ir ◦M) ≤ ∆(Ir)/k.
The problem, however, remains in determining the actual sensitivity of Ir. By defini-
tion of sensitivity, the maximum change that occurs in Ir, as a result of a single record
being different in the dataset X on which Ir is applied, can be estimated as the range of
Dom(X), when the attributes of X are numerical. For example, if an attribute a in a
dataset represents the height of a person, and Dom(a) = [amin, amax], the difference in
the result of Ir that the presence or abscence of an individual in this dataset causes is
bounded by the range [amin, amax]. This is, however, a very na¨ıve estimation, because it
assumes that this attribute values in the dataset, are representative of the attribute val-
ues of the population. Particularly, it means that the population outliers are represented
in the dataset.
Despite being a very rough estimate, we will use it to scale the amount of noise added
to the data that will eventually be released. More accurately, we will estimate the
sensitivity of an attribute j for the function Ir over a dataset X as
∆j
(
Ir(X)
)
= 1.5×
(
max
(
Dom(Xj))−min
(
Dom(Xj))
)
(6.6)
Notice that a scaling factor of 1.5 is applied, in order to make the estimation more
reasonable. The idea of this estimation was also drawn from Soria-Comas et al. [14].
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6.7.1.3 Putting it all together
Given a dataset X with m attributes, the DifferentialPrivacyFilter class imple-
ments the Laplace mechanism
M(X) = (Ir ◦M)(X) + L
where M is an insensitive k-microaggregation function and L is a vector of random
variables lj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, each drawn from a Laplace distribution Lapj(0, bj), with bj
being the scale parameter, estimated by
bj =
∆j
(
Ir(X)
)
ε
A general and high level description of the complete mechanism, adapted to a streaming
environment, is given in Algorithm 6.6. Notice that a single instance is processed in the
algorithm pseudo-code: the privacy filter executes the mechanism for each instance in
the input data stream. All the involved classes and modules of the actual implementation
can be seen in Figure 6.12. The general cost of this method can be approximated to the
same as the MicroAggregtionFilter: O(n · b · log(k)).
Algorithm 6.6: Microaggregation-based Laplace Mechanism
Data: an instance x from a stream, an insensitive microaggregation function M and a
Laplace noise adder L
Result: an anonymized instance x′
begin
µ←M(x);
x′ ← L(µ);
return x′;
end
The adaptation of the insensitive microaggregation algorithm to a stream processing en-
vironment follows the same scheme presented for the MicroAggregationFilter (see Sec-
tion 6.5.1), the only difference being the use of a reference point in order to achieve a
total ordering relation between the instances of the stream and, thus, fulfilling the in-
sensitivity condition. The reference “point”, denoted by R, is incrementally11 built as
new instances are processed by the filter, this is, it is updated independently of the
11Remember that, in a stream processing environment, and more precisely, in the context of a buffered
filter (see Section 6.5.1.1), only a portion of the complete dataset (the stream) is visible to the algorithm
at a given moment.
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*
   1
LaplaceMechanism
+ addLaplaceNoise(instance : Instance) : Instance
LaplacianNoiseGenerator
- mu : Double
- b : Double
- rand : RandomGenerator
+ nextLaplacian() : Double
+ nextLaplacian(mu, b) : Double
TotalOrderKNNMicroaggregator
- k : Integer
- instanceBuffer : Instance []
- anonymized : Boolean []
+ TotalOrderKNNMicroaggregator(k : Integer)
+ addInstance(instance : Instance)
+ nextMicroaggregatedInstance() : Instance
«abstract»
AbstractStreamFilter
# inputStream : InstanceStream
«interface»
AnonymizationFilter
+ nextAnonimizedInstancePair() : InstancePair
+ prepareFilterForUse()
+ restartFilter()
«abstract»
PrivacyFilter
DifferentialPrivacyFilter «abstract»
LaplacianNoiseScaleEstimator
# epsilon : Double
+ LaplacianNoiseScaleEstimator(epsilon : Double)
+ estimateScale(value : Double) 
DomainRangeScaleEstimator
- min : Double
- max : Double
Figure 6.12: DifferentialPrivacyFilter and the related classes and types it uses.
Notice that the LaplaceMechanism uses many noise scale estimators, one for each
attribute in the stream.
clustering step, when a new instance is added to the buffer. The necessary modifications
are presented in Algorithm 6.7.
Algorithm 6.7: KNN-based Insensitive Clustering
Data: W ′, A buffers and R, the current reference point
Result: a cluster C of k instances
begin
C ← ∅;
Q← PriorityQueue〈DistanceInstancePair〉();
for x ∈W ′, x /∈ A do
d← dist(x,R);
p← DistanceInstancePair(d, x);
if |Q| < k then
Q← Q ∪ p;
else
if p < Q.peek().distance() then
Q.poll();
Q← Q ∪ p;
for q ∈ Q do
C ← C ∪ q.instance();
return C;
end
The Laplace-distributed noise addition step of the mechanism is performed by a noise
adder (called L in Algorithm 6.6) that works in a very similar fashion to the NoiseAdditionFilter,
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with the addition of the scale parameter estimation, already discussed before. The com-
plete description of the procedure is given in Algorithm 6.8 and, finally, the generation
of a random variable Λ following a Laplace distribution is shown in the equation below:
Λ ∼ Lap(µ, b) ⇐⇒ Λ = µ− b sgn(U) ln(1− 2|U |) (6.7)
where U is another random variable drawn from a uniform distribution constrained to
the (−0.5, 0.5] interval.
Algorithm 6.8: Laplace Noise Adder
Data: an instance x and a vector B of scale estimators
Result: an anonymized instance x′
begin
for i ∈ attributes(x) do
b← Bi.estimate(xi);
x′i ← xi + Random.laplace(0, b);
return x′;
end
6.7.2 Summary
The DifferentialPrivacyFilter class implements a microaggregation-based Laplace
mechanism to achieve ε-differential privacy sanitization of released data. Table 6.5 sum-
marizes the main properties of this SDC method.
DifferentialPrivacyFilter
Parameters k (cluster size), ε (differential privacy), b (buffer size)
Type of data Numerical data only
Cost O(n · b · log(k))
Table 6.5: DifferentialPrivacyFilter summary.
Chapter 7
Benchmarking
This chapter shows the benchmarks that have been performed with the privacy filters
which implementation was detailed in Chapter 6. A brief introduction is given to the
software and hardware resources involved in the benchmark process in 7.1. The final
results are displayed in Section 7.2.
7.1 Experimental setup
A simple experimental setup has been used to assess the performance of the MOA
privacy filters in terms of disclosure risk and information loss. To do so, a MOA task1
was specifically designed to retrieve the results of the evaluation measures of the filters.
7.1.1 MOA generators
In order to test the filters, streams of synthetically generated data have been used,
rather than actual datasets, mainly because, this way, we avoid the complex and time
consuming preprocessing of real datasets.
The MOA framework offers a rich set of stream data generators, of which we chose the
RandomRBFGenerator and the WaveformGenerator. Both streams consist of numerical
variables only. Even though most of the implemented filters are capable of dealing with
heterogeneous data, some previous tests had shown that the information loss evaluation,
based on the SSE estimation, pondered too much categorical attributes differences, thus
getting disturbed IL measurements.
1Within the MOA framework, tasks define a procedure to run as the main program, like a classifier
or regression learning task.
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The RandomRBFGenerator outputs a stream of 10 attributes and 1 class variable, drawing
values for those attributes from radial basis functions (RBFs). The class variable is
indeed a categorical one, indicating to which RBF an instance belongs, this is, the
intended machine learning task of this generator is classification.
The WaveformGenerator generates values by combining two or three base wave func-
tions, which form a numerical stream of 21 attributes and 1 class variable. The machine
learning task intended for this generator is, again, classification.
7.1.2 Experimental design
The experiments undertaken during the benchmarking stage of the project consist in
generating streams of synthetic data and pipe those streams through each of the privacy
filters, for each of the parameters permutations that we decided, taking 100000 instances
from the generators. A summary of paramaters values used in those experiments is shown
in Table 7.1.
Parameters
Privacy filter Name Range Selected values
NoiseAdditionFilter a [0, 1] ∈ R 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0
c [0, 1] ∈ R 0.0
MicroAggregationFilter b N+ 100, 250, 500, 1000
k N+, k ≤ b 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100
RankSwappingFilter b N+ 100, 250, 500, 1000
p [1, 100] ∈ N+ 10, 25, 50, 75, 80
DifferentialPrivacyFilter b N+ 100, 250, 500, 1000
k N+, k ≤ b 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100
ε R+ 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100
Table 7.1: Privacy filters benchmark parameterization.
The optimal situation would have been to execute each filter configuration (each pa-
rameters permutation) a number of times, in order to statistically validate the results.
However, due to the lack of time and resources available, a single execution of each filter
was performed during the benchmark phase.
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7.1.3 Hardware
The executions of the filters were executed in the following hardware environment2:
Category Description
Computer model Asus k53-SV
CPU Model Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2430M, 64 bit
Frequency 2.40GHz
Cores 2 (4 virtual threads available)
Cache 32KB data L1
32KB instructions L1
256KB L2 per core
3072KB shared L3
Memory Capacity 8GB
Frequency 1333MHz
Table 7.2: Hardware benchamark setting.
7.1.4 Software
The following software was involved in the execution of the privacy filters benchmarks:
• Operating System: Ubuntu 12.04 LTS with the Linux kernel 3.2.0-80 version
• Java: Java 1.7.0 75 (OpenJDK Runtime Environment, version IcedTea 2.5.4)
• Python: Python 2.7 (to execute the scripts running the actual MOA tasks)
7.2 Results
We provide now the results of the execution of the privacy filters, with the configuration
specified in the previous section. For each filter, we present summary tables with the
disclosure risk and information loss estimates for each parameterization, as well as plots
showing the evolution of both measurements against the number of instances processed.
2Only the relevant specifications to the execution of the filters are included.
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7.2.1 Noise addition
All the considered parameterizations for the NoiseAdditionFilter are reflected on Ta-
ble 7.3 and Table 7.4. The evolution of disclosure risk against the number of instances
processed is shown in Figure 7.1 and information loss is shown in Figure 7.2.
a c DR IL
0.1 0.0 0.956 1123.97
0.25 0.0 0.889 7024.83
0.5 0.0 0.774 28099.33
0.75 0.0 0.596 63223.50
1.0 0.0 0.430 112397.34
Table 7.3: Noise addition IL
& DR estimations for all consid-
ered parameterizations with the
RandomRBFGenerator.
a c DR IL
0.1 0.0 1.000 50741.41
0.25 0.0 1.000 317133.83
0.5 0.0 0.996 1268535.34
0.75 0.0 0.919 2854204.53
1.0 0.0 0.742 5074141.39
Table 7.4: Noise addition IL
& DR estimations for all consid-
ered parameterizations with the
WaveformGenerator.
As was anticipated in the theoretical introduction chapter, the NoiseAdditionFilter
is not able to protect data as much as other methods do. The results of its application on
the RandomRBFGenerator data prove to be much better than on the WaveformGenerator,
on which has almost no effect at all. Even the high amount of noise introduced, it is
not really protecting data against disclosure — although the a control parameter of the
filter is set to its maximum value (a = 1), the disclosure risk is quite high.
The effect of the noise scaling factor controlled by the a parameter can cleary be seen
on Figure 7.2: the higher the value of the parameter, the higher the information loss.
Another important thing to notice is that the amount of noise added for each instance
remains constant, this is, the increment in the total information loss measure grows
linearly.
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Figure 7.1: NoiseAdditionFilter DR evaluation using the RandomRBFGenerator
with fixed parameter c = 0.
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Figure 7.2: NoiseAdditionFilter IL evaluation using the RandomRBFGenerator with
fixed parameter c = 0, on a logarithmic scale.
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7.2.2 Microaggregation
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the final values for both information loss and disclosure risk for
increasing values of the cluster size of the partition step of the microaggregation algo-
rithm (the k parameter) and a fixed historical buffer size of b = 100. Additional tables are
provided in Appendix A for the rest of the considered buffer sizes. The evolution of dis-
closure risk against the number of instances processed for the MicroaggregationFilter
is shown in Figure 7.3 and information loss is shown in Figure 7.4.
b k DR IL
100 3 0.232 74917.30
100 5 0.144 89953.68
100 10 0.089 101193.72
100 15 0.069 104952.79
100 20 0.061 106800.51
100 25 0.055 107937.42
100 50 0.041 110179.72
100 100 0.030 111313.78
Table 7.5: Microaggregation IL &
DR estimations for increasing k (clus-
ter size) and fixed buffer size b = 100
with the RandomRBFGenerator.
b k DR IL
100 3 0.241 3375656.78
100 5 0.135 4057649.13
100 10 0.076 4566550.54
100 15 0.061 4739204.47
100 20 0.054 4822716.29
100 25 0.049 4872587.52
100 50 0.038 4976718.32
100 100 0.029 5027574.64
Table 7.6: Microaggregation IL &
DR estimations for increasing k (clus-
ter size) and fixed buffer size b = 100
with the WaveformGenerator.
As shown in the tables above, the MicroaggregationFilter disclosure risk performance
is almost the same for both streams (unlike the NoiseAdditionFilter). The total
disclosure risk diminishes as the size of the clusters formed increases, which is a direct
consequence of the theoretical privacy guarantee that microaggregation offers: because
k-anonymity is implemented through this algorithmic scheme, the maximum disclosure
risk for a given k is DR ≤ 1/k.
The couple of figures included below show an interesting result of the microaggregation
filter. Even though the size of the clusters does not affect too much the amount of noise
introduced in the data (see Figure 7.4), the increase of the of the k parameter offers much
better privacy protection than that achieved with lower values. We can anonymize data,
obtaining good (low) disclosure risk and not losing too much utility in the process with
respect to configurations that yield poorer disclosure risk results.
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Figure 7.3: MicroaggregationFilter DR evaluation using the RandomRBFGenerator
with fixed buffer size b = 100, for increasing k.
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Figure 7.4: MicroaggregationFilter IL evaluation using the RandomRBFGenerator
with fixed buffer size b = 100, for increasing k, on a logarithmic scale.
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7.2.3 Rank swapping
A comparison of the performance of the RankSwappingFilter on the streams produced
by the RandomRBFGenerator and WaveformGenerator can be seen in Table 7.7 and Ta-
ble 7.8. The remaining tables of results can be consulted in the Appendix A. Figure 7.5
shows the disclosure risk estimation against the number of instances processed, for in-
creasing values of the p parameter and two buffer sizes (b = 100 and b = 500). The
information loss estimate of the corresponding parameterizations is shown in Figure 7.6.
b p DR IL
100 10 0.838 19136.62
100 25 0.469 57753.05
100 50 0.070 136791.17
100 75 0.036 178200.11
100 80 0.037 178685.81
Table 7.7: Rank swapping IL & DR
estimations for increasing p (maximum
swap range) and fixed buffer size b =
100 with the RandomRBFGenerator.
b p DR IL
100 10 0.997 705196.07
100 25 0.776 2464673.56
100 50 0.112 6195304.18
100 75 0.046 8088473.27
100 80 0.045 8097619.70
Table 7.8: Rank swapping IL & DR
estimations for increasing p (maximum
swap range) and fixed buffer size b =
100 with the WaveformGenerator.
As we see in both Table 7.7 and Table 7.8, the maximum swap range, defined as the
percentage p of the size of the buffer, is indeed a key factor to achieve good results,
concerning the disclosure risk of the anonymized data. Both tables show that, for swap
ranges shorter than half the size of the window, the risk or fe-identification is too high.
The remaining parameter of this filter, the size of the buffer, is also, in this case, an
important factor to leverage when using the RankSwappingFilter. For bigger buffer
sizes, the information loss incurred decreases, but the disclosure risk grows too much.
The cause behind this increase in the revelation risk could be the usage of synthetical
data: for bigger buffer sizes, because generated attribute values are sensibly close to
each other, the difference between the swapped values is smaller, thus generating lower
noise and exposing more information to an attacker.
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Figure 7.5: RankSwappingFilter DR evaluation using the RandomRBFGenerator with
buffer sizes b = 100 and b = 500, for increasing p.
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Figure 7.6: RankSwappingFilter IL evaluation using the RandomRBFGenerator with
buffer sizes b = 100 and b = 500, for increasing p, on a logarithmic scale.
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7.2.4 ε-Differential private microaggregation
An aggregate of five “subtables” is shown in Table 7.9: the disclosure risk and informa-
tion loss results are assessed for increasing values of cluster size k, increasing differential
privacy scale factors, controlled by the ε parameter, and fixed historical buffer size
b = 250. The complete set of results tables is located in Appendix A.
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Figure 7.7: DifferentialPrivacyFilter DR evaluation using the
RandomRBFGenerator with fixed buffer size b = 100 and fixed differential privacy scale
parameter ε = 1, for increasing k.
The DifferentialPrivacyFilter performs really well in terms of disclosure risk, for
any of the parameters combinations displayed. However, for small values of ε, the
amount of noise added to data is really high. Confirming the hipothesis presented
in Section 6.7.1, increasing the size of the clusters k achieves a reduction in the sensitivity
of the release function of the data, thus reducing the Laplacian noise introduced, thus
reducing information loss. This effect can be seen for values of ε up to 10, but is not
visible for ε = 100, because, for such a high ε, the majority of the added noise is indeed
caused by the microaggregation function, not by the Laplace mechanism. This effect can
also be assessed in Figure 7.9, where the value of ε is fixed and k increases, effectively
reducing information loss.
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b ε k DR IL
250 0.01 3 0.004 3.298E+11
250 0.01 5 0.004 2.483E+11
250 0.01 10 0.004 2.033E+11
250 0.01 15 0.005 1.885E+11
250 0.01 20 0.004 1.880E+11
250 0.01 25 0.004 1.881E+11
250 0.01 50 0.005 1.502E+11
250 0.01 100 0.005 1.050E+11
b ε k DR IL
250 0.1 3 0.005 3.298E+09
250 0.1 5 0.005 2.483E+09
250 0.1 10 0.004 2.033E+09
250 0.1 15 0.005 1.885E+09
250 0.1 20 0.005 1.880E+09
250 0.1 25 0.004 1.881E+09
250 0.1 50 0.005 1.502E+09
250 0.1 100 0.005 1.050E+09
b ε k DR IL
250 1.0 3 0.006 3.305E+07
250 1.0 5 0.005 2.492E+07
250 1.0 10 0.005 2.043E+07
250 1.0 15 0.005 1.896E+07
250 1.0 20 0.005 1.890E+07
250 1.0 25 0.005 1.892E+07
250 1.0 50 0.005 1.513E+07
250 1.0 100 0.005 1.062E+07
b ε k DR IL
250 10 3 0.032 3.985E+05
250 10 5 0.019 3.345E+05
250 10 10 0.012 3.021E+05
250 10 15 0.011 2.917E+05
250 10 20 0.010 2.934E+05
250 10 25 0.009 2.950E+05
250 10 50 0.006 2.600E+05
250 10 100 0.005 2.164E+05
b ε k DR IL
250 100 3 0.155 7.152E+04
250 100 5 0.079 8.824E+04
250 100 10 0.041 1.004E+05
250 100 15 0.027 1.047E+05
250 100 20 0.022 1.069E+05
250 100 25 0.019 1.083E+05
250 100 50 0.010 1.110E+05
250 100 100 0.006 1.122E+05
Table 7.9: Differential privacy DR & IL estimations for increasing ε and k values and
fixed buffer size (b = 250). Results from the execution with the RandomRBFGenerator.
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Figure 7.8: DifferentialPrivacyFilter DR evaluation using the
RandomRBFGenerator with fixed buffer size b = 100 and fixed cluster size k = 3, for
increasing ε differential privacy scale factor.
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Figure 7.9: DifferentialPrivacyFilter IL evaluation using the
RandomRBFGenerator with fixed buffer size b = 100 and fixed differential privacy scale
parameter ε = 1, for increasing k, on a logarithmic scale.
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Figure 7.10: DifferentialPrivacyFilter IL evaluation using the
RandomRBFGenerator with fixed buffer size b = 100 and fixed cluster size k = 3, for
increasing ε differential privacy scale factor, on a logarithmic scale.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Achieved goals
The present report assesses the inception, development and benchmarking of the imple-
mentation of several Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) methods, adapted to the MOA
data stream mining framework. Concerning the actual goals of the project, we can say
that it has ultimately been successful: the main requirements have been fulfilled and the
resulting work has proven its performance and utility for the data science community.
First, a thorough theoretical background analysis had to be done in order to select the
approaches best suited to the implementation of the filters on the MOA environment.
Moreover, the state of the art of existing solutions was reviewed and some technology
alternatives were considered before the actual development of the algorithms.
Four MOA privacy preserving filters have been developed, implementing the following
SDC methods: noise addition, microaggregation, data rank swapping and a microaggre-
gation based differential privacy mechanism. Each of the algorithms has been adapted
from well-known solutions, already in use in non-streaming data analysis settings, in or-
der to enable their utilization in stream processing tasks. Special emphasis has been put
in easing the filters customization, either by setting the appropriate parameterizations
or by actually modifying parts of their behaviour exploiting the extensibility that the
MOA framework offers us. Finally, all four filters have been benchmarked to assess their
quality in terms of two important SDC measurments: disclosure risk and information
loss. These quality parameters are evaluated using estimators, which implementation
has also been adapted to the streams processing setting from existing alternatives. While
some of the methods perform better than others, they all offer results that conform to
their theoretical limits.
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Even though this work can be improved and extended by implementing some more SDC
mechanisms, it is most useful to protect people’s privacy, which was the main goal of this
project. It is yet another contribution aimed to enhance the preservation of the universal
right to privacy, which definitely deserves more attention from the IT community than
it actually gets.
On the personal side, the development of this project has brought me a closer under-
standing of SDC, a field that was almost unknown to me, and has reassured the interest
I have for two of the main concerns of the project: data science and the relation be-
tween technology and society, since privacy preservation is, indeed, the project’s most
important outcome. Beyond this, the possibility of working in an open source project
and being able to contribute to its extension has proved to be really engaging.
Finally, I am certainly happy of having found a project in which all the skills and
knowledge acquired throughout these years as an undergraduate student could be put in
practice. Not only algorithmical theory and statistics-related concepts have been used,
but also analytical rigour and good practices in terms of software architechture and
development were necessary for the project’s success.
8.2 Future work
Different aspects of this project deserve to be considered for future enhancements, rang-
ing from algorithmic details to benchmarking methods.
First and foremost, there is a particular non-functional requirement that could be em-
phasized in the future: documentation. The confection of a user manual for the MOA
extension that the privacy filters represent would be a great complement to the tool-
suite. In addition, the developed package should be released, as a binary distribution, to
a central repository, in order to ease access not only to the source code, that is already
public, but to ready for use bundles.
Concerning the algorithmic facet of the project, there is room for performance improve-
ment, in terms of computational complexity and execution time. Advanced and more
customized data structures could be used, as well as some other design approaches.
Moreover, a complete code base refactoring should be carried out to adapt the SDC
methods to the changes introduced by the latest MOA release, that was published while
developing the filters for this project.
Finally, a more rigorous benchmark process could also be set up, running multiple exe-
cutions to assess statistically valid results and applying the filters to real world dataset,
for example, all of which could not be done due to the lack of time available.
Appendix A
Results tables
The following are the complete tables of the benchmark process performed using each
of the privacy filters, for all the parameterizations defined in the experiments design.
NoiseAdditionFilter
a c DR IL
0.1 0.0 0.956 1123.97
0.25 0.0 0.889 7024.83
0.5 0.0 0.774 28099.33
0.75 0.0 0.596 63223.50
1.0 0.0 0.430 112397.34
Table A.1: Noise addition IL & DR estimations for all considered parameterizations
with the RandomRBF generator.
a c DR IL
0.1 0.0 1.000 50741.41
0.25 0.0 1.000 317133.83
0.5 0.0 0.996 1268535.34
0.75 0.0 0.919 2854204.53
1.0 0.0 0.742 5074141.39
Table A.2: Noise addition IL & DR estimations for all considered parameterizations
with the Waveform generator.
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MicroAggregationFilter
b k DR IL
100 3 0.232 74917.30
100 5 0.144 89953.68
100 10 0.089 101193.72
100 15 0.069 104952.79
100 20 0.061 106800.51
100 25 0.055 107937.42
100 50 0.041 110179.72
100 100 0.030 111313.78
b k DR IL
250 3 0.153 74917.30
250 5 0.089 89953.68
250 10 0.051 101193.72
250 15 0.039 104952.79
250 20 0.034 106800.51
250 25 0.031 107937.42
250 50 0.025 110179.72
250 100 0.018 111313.78
b k DR IL
500 3 0.109 74917.30
500 5 0.060 89953.68
500 10 0.033 101193.72
500 15 0.025 104952.79
500 20 0.021 106800.51
500 25 0.019 107937.42
500 50 0.015 110179.72
500 100 0.012 111313.78
b k DR IL
1000 3 0.078 74917.30
1000 5 0.040 89953.68
1000 10 0.021 101193.72
1000 15 0.015 104952.79
1000 20 0.013 106800.51
1000 25 0.011 107937.42
1000 50 0.009 110179.72
1000 100 0.008 111313.78
Table A.3: Microaggregation IL & DR estimations for all considered parameteriza-
tions with the RandomRBF generator.
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b k DR IL
100 3 0.241 3375656.78
100 5 0.135 4057649.13
100 10 0.076 4566550.54
100 15 0.061 4739204.47
100 20 0.054 4822716.29
100 25 0.049 4872587.52
100 50 0.038 4976718.32
100 100 0.029 5027574.64
b k DR IL
250 3 0.186 3375656.78
250 5 0.092 4057649.13
250 10 0.045 4566550.54
250 15 0.035 4739204.47
250 20 0.030 4822716.29
250 25 0.027 4872587.52
250 50 0.022 4976718.32
250 100 0.017 5027574.64
b k DR IL
500 3 0.152 3375656.78
500 5 0.068 4057649.13
500 10 0.030 4566550.54
500 15 0.022 4739204.47
500 20 0.019 4822716.29
500 25 0.017 4872587.52
500 50 0.013 4976718.32
500 100 0.012 5027574.64
b k DR IL
1000 3 0.125 3375656.78
1000 5 0.050 4057649.13
1000 10 0.020 4566550.54
1000 15 0.014 4739204.47
1000 20 0.011 4822716.29
1000 25 0.010 4872587.52
1000 50 0.007 4976718.32
1000 100 0.007 5027574.64
Table A.4: Microaggregation IL & DR estimations for all considered parameteriza-
tions with the Waveform generator.
Appendix A. Results tables 90
RankSwappingFilter
b p DR IL
100 10 0.838 19136.62
100 25 0.469 57753.05
100 50 0.070 136791.17
100 75 0.036 178200.11
100 80 0.037 178685.81
b p DR IL
250 10 0.910 6875.94
250 25 0.749 17803.36
250 50 0.473 41889.27
250 75 0.211 70737.65
250 80 0.176 76772.86
b p DR IL
500 10 0.953 3402.06
500 25 0.844 8210.11
500 50 0.679 17322.47
500 75 0.523 28339.42
500 80 0.493 30792.56
b p DR IL
1000 10 0.980 1670.47
1000 25 0.916 4048.45
1000 50 0.801 7993.85
1000 75 0.699 12328.09
1000 80 0.681 13204.72
Table A.5: Rank swapping IL & DR estimations for all considered parameterizations
with the RandomRBF generator.
b p DR IL
100 10 0.997 705196.07
100 25 0.776 2464673.56
100 50 0.112 6195304.18
100 75 0.046 8088473.27
100 80 0.045 8097619.70
b p DR IL
250 10 1.000 185228.04
250 25 0.996 643029.21
250 50 0.872 1729458.77
250 75 0.491 3077876.57
250 80 0.415 3362868.67
b p DR IL
500 10 1.000 69572.08
500 25 1.000 233509.06
500 50 0.995 621635.78
500 75 0.955 1118353.33
500 80 0.937 1229266.47
b p DR IL
1000 10 1.000 27149.30
1000 25 1.000 86497.92
1000 50 1.000 225324.49
1000 75 0.999 401418.85
1000 80 0.998 440628.83
Table A.6: Rank swapping IL & DR estimations for all considered parameterizations
with the Waveform generator.
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DifferentialPrivacyFilter
b ε k DR IL
100 0.01 3 0.010 3.122E+11
100 0.01 5 0.010 2.411E+11
100 0.01 10 0.010 1.959E+11
100 0.01 15 0.010 1.867E+11
100 0.01 20 0.010 1.861E+11
100 0.01 25 0.010 1.771E+11
100 0.01 50 0.010 1.007E+11
100 0.01 100 0.010 1.860E+09
b ε k DR IL
250 0.01 3 0.004 3.298E+11
250 0.01 5 0.004 2.483E+11
250 0.01 10 0.004 2.033E+11
250 0.01 15 0.005 1.885E+11
250 0.01 20 0.004 1.880E+11
250 0.01 25 0.004 1.881E+11
250 0.01 50 0.005 1.502E+11
250 0.01 100 0.005 1.050E+11
b ε k DR IL
500 0.01 3 0.002 3.222E+11
500 0.01 5 0.002 2.557E+11
500 0.01 10 0.002 2.011E+11
500 0.01 15 0.002 1.876E+11
500 0.01 20 0.002 1.949E+11
500 0.01 25 0.002 1.917E+11
500 0.01 50 0.002 1.693E+11
500 0.01 100 0.002 1.454E+11
b ε k DR IL
1000 0.01 3 0.001 3.332E+11
1000 0.01 5 0.001 2.618E+11
1000 0.01 10 0.001 2.000E+11
1000 0.01 15 0.001 1.724E+11
1000 0.01 20 0.001 1.922E+11
1000 0.01 25 0.001 1.995E+11
1000 0.01 50 0.001 1.744E+11
1000 0.01 100 0.001 1.616E+11
Table A.7: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 0.01 with the
RandomRBF generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 0.1 3 0.010 3.122E+09
100 0.1 5 0.010 2.411E+09
100 0.1 10 0.010 1.960E+09
100 0.1 15 0.010 1.867E+09
100 0.1 20 0.010 1.861E+09
100 0.1 25 0.010 1.771E+09
100 0.1 50 0.010 1.007E+09
100 0.1 100 0.010 1.871E+07
b ε k DR IL
250 0.1 3 0.005 3.298E+09
250 0.1 5 0.005 2.483E+09
250 0.1 10 0.004 2.033E+09
250 0.1 15 0.005 1.885E+09
250 0.1 20 0.005 1.880E+09
250 0.1 25 0.004 1.881E+09
250 0.1 50 0.005 1.502E+09
250 0.1 100 0.005 1.050E+09
b ε k DR IL
500 0.1 3 0.002 3.222E+09
500 0.1 5 0.002 2.558E+09
500 0.1 10 0.002 2.011E+09
500 0.1 15 0.002 1.877E+09
500 0.1 20 0.002 1.949E+09
500 0.1 25 0.002 1.917E+09
500 0.1 50 0.002 1.693E+09
500 0.1 100 0.002 1.454E+09
b ε k DR IL
1000 0.1 3 0.001 3.332E+09
1000 0.1 5 0.001 2.618E+09
1000 0.1 10 0.001 2.000E+09
1000 0.1 15 0.001 1.724E+09
1000 0.1 20 0.001 1.923E+09
1000 0.1 25 0.001 1.995E+09
1000 0.1 50 0.001 1.744E+09
1000 0.1 100 0.001 1.616E+09
Table A.8: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 0.1 with the
RandomRBF generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 1.0 3 0.013 3.129E+07
100 1.0 5 0.012 2.420E+07
100 1.0 10 0.011 1.970E+07
100 1.0 15 0.011 1.878E+07
100 1.0 20 0.011 1.872E+07
100 1.0 25 0.011 1.782E+07
100 1.0 50 0.010 1.019E+07
100 1.0 100 0.010 2.977E+05
b ε k DR IL
250 1.0 3 0.006 3.305E+07
250 1.0 5 0.005 2.492E+07
250 1.0 10 0.005 2.043E+07
250 1.0 15 0.005 1.896E+07
250 1.0 20 0.005 1.890E+07
250 1.0 25 0.005 1.892E+07
250 1.0 50 0.005 1.513E+07
250 1.0 100 0.005 1.062E+07
b ε k DR IL
500 1.0 3 0.003 3.229E+07
500 1.0 5 0.003 2.567E+07
500 1.0 10 0.003 2.022E+07
500 1.0 15 0.002 1.887E+07
500 1.0 20 0.002 1.960E+07
500 1.0 25 0.002 1.928E+07
500 1.0 50 0.003 1.704E+07
500 1.0 100 0.002 1.466E+07
b ε k DR IL
1000 1.0 3 0.002 3.339E+07
1000 1.0 5 0.002 2.627E+07
1000 1.0 10 0.001 2.010E+07
1000 1.0 15 0.001 1.735E+07
1000 1.0 20 0.001 1.933E+07
1000 1.0 25 0.001 2.006E+07
1000 1.0 50 0.001 1.755E+07
1000 1.0 100 0.001 1.627E+07
Table A.9: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 1.0 with the
RandomRBF generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 10 3 0.059 3.809E+05
100 10 5 0.038 3.271E+05
100 10 10 0.025 2.948E+05
100 10 15 0.020 2.900E+05
100 10 20 0.018 2.919E+05
100 10 25 0.016 2.843E+05
100 10 50 0.011 2.111E+05
100 10 100 0.011 1.132E+05
b ε k DR IL
250 10 3 0.032 3.985E+05
250 10 5 0.019 3.345E+05
250 10 10 0.012 3.021E+05
250 10 15 0.011 2.917E+05
250 10 20 0.010 2.934E+05
250 10 25 0.009 2.950E+05
250 10 50 0.006 2.600E+05
250 10 100 0.005 2.164E+05
b ε k DR IL
500 10 3 0.022 3.907E+05
500 10 5 0.012 3.421E+05
500 10 10 0.008 2.997E+05
500 10 15 0.006 2.907E+05
500 10 20 0.006 3.004E+05
500 10 25 0.006 2.985E+05
500 10 50 0.004 2.789E+05
500 10 100 0.003 2.567E+05
b ε k DR IL
1000 10 3 0.015 4.019E+05
1000 10 5 0.008 3.480E+05
1000 10 10 0.005 2.986E+05
1000 10 15 0.004 2.755E+05
1000 10 20 0.004 2.976E+05
1000 10 25 0.004 3.062E+05
1000 10 50 0.003 2.841E+05
1000 10 100 0.002 2.729E+05
Table A.10: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 10 with the
RandomRBF generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 100 3 0.187 7.148E+04
100 100 5 0.103 8.819E+04
100 100 10 0.053 1.004E+05
100 100 15 0.035 1.049E+05
100 100 20 0.027 1.072E+05
100 100 25 0.023 1.086E+05
100 100 50 0.012 1.111E+05
100 100 100 0.011 1.113E+05
b ε k DR IL
250 100 3 0.155 7.152E+04
250 100 5 0.079 8.824E+04
250 100 10 0.041 1.004E+05
250 100 15 0.027 1.047E+05
250 100 20 0.022 1.069E+05
250 100 25 0.019 1.083E+05
250 100 50 0.010 1.110E+05
250 100 100 0.006 1.122E+05
b ε k DR IL
500 100 3 0.139 7.136E+04
500 100 5 0.067 8.840E+04
500 100 10 0.037 1.003E+05
500 100 15 0.023 1.047E+05
500 100 20 0.019 1.070E+05
500 100 25 0.016 1.083E+05
500 100 50 0.009 1.110E+05
500 100 100 0.005 1.124E+05
b ε k DR IL
1000 100 3 0.125 7.149E+04
1000 100 5 0.058 8.848E+04
1000 100 10 0.034 1.003E+05
1000 100 15 0.020 1.045E+05
1000 100 20 0.017 1.068E+05
1000 100 25 0.015 1.082E+05
1000 100 50 0.008 1.110E+05
1000 100 100 0.004 1.125E+05
Table A.11: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 100 with the
RandomRBF generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 0.01 3 0.010 8.511E+12
100 0.01 5 0.010 7.466E+12
100 0.01 10 0.010 6.583E+12
100 0.01 15 0.010 5.583E+12
100 0.01 20 0.010 5.270E+12
100 0.01 25 0.010 5.202E+12
100 0.01 50 0.010 3.307E+12
100 0.01 100 0.010 8.695E+10
b ε k DR IL
250 0.01 3 0.004 8.293E+12
250 0.01 5 0.004 7.621E+12
250 0.01 10 0.004 6.561E+12
250 0.01 15 0.004 5.672E+12
250 0.01 20 0.004 5.226E+12
250 0.01 25 0.004 5.289E+12
250 0.01 50 0.004 4.564E+12
250 0.01 100 0.004 2.640E+12
b ε k DR IL
500 0.01 3 0.002 8.370E+12
500 0.01 5 0.002 7.711E+12
500 0.01 10 0.002 6.765E+12
500 0.01 15 0.002 5.900E+12
500 0.01 20 0.002 5.471E+12
500 0.01 25 0.002 5.420E+12
500 0.01 50 0.002 4.578E+12
500 0.01 100 0.002 3.559E+12
b ε k DR IL
1000 0.01 3 0.001 8.331E+12
1000 0.01 5 0.001 7.569E+12
1000 0.01 10 0.001 6.751E+12
1000 0.01 15 0.001 6.017E+12
1000 0.01 20 0.001 5.606E+12
1000 0.01 25 0.001 5.296E+12
1000 0.01 50 0.001 4.511E+12
1000 0.01 100 0.001 3.703E+12
Table A.12: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 0.01 with the
Waveform generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 0.1 3 0.010 8.512E+10
100 0.1 5 0.010 7.467E+10
100 0.1 10 0.010 6.584E+10
100 0.1 15 0.010 5.584E+10
100 0.1 20 0.010 5.270E+10
100 0.1 25 0.010 5.203E+10
100 0.1 50 0.010 3.307E+10
100 0.1 100 0.010 8.746E+08
b ε k DR IL
250 0.1 3 0.004 8.293E+10
250 0.1 5 0.004 7.621E+10
250 0.1 10 0.004 6.562E+10
250 0.1 15 0.004 5.673E+10
250 0.1 20 0.004 5.227E+10
250 0.1 25 0.004 5.289E+10
250 0.1 50 0.004 4.564E+10
250 0.1 100 0.004 2.640E+10
b ε k DR IL
500 0.1 3 0.002 8.370E+10
500 0.1 5 0.002 7.712E+10
500 0.1 10 0.002 6.765E+10
500 0.1 15 0.002 5.901E+10
500 0.1 20 0.002 5.472E+10
500 0.1 25 0.002 5.420E+10
500 0.1 50 0.002 4.579E+10
500 0.1 100 0.002 3.560E+10
b ε k DR IL
1000 0.1 3 0.001 8.331E+10
1000 0.1 5 0.001 7.569E+10
1000 0.1 10 0.001 6.751E+10
1000 0.1 15 0.001 6.017E+10
1000 0.1 20 0.001 5.607E+10
1000 0.1 25 0.001 5.296E+10
1000 0.1 50 0.001 4.511E+10
1000 0.1 100 0.001 3.703E+10
Table A.13: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 0.1 with the
Waveform generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 1.0 3 0.014 8.542E+08
100 1.0 5 0.012 7.505E+08
100 1.0 10 0.011 6.629E+08
100 1.0 15 0.010 5.631E+08
100 1.0 20 0.010 5.318E+08
100 1.0 25 0.010 5.251E+08
100 1.0 50 0.010 3.357E+08
100 1.0 100 0.010 1.373E+07
b ε k DR IL
250 1.0 3 0.006 8.323E+08
250 1.0 5 0.005 7.660E+08
250 1.0 10 0.005 6.607E+08
250 1.0 15 0.004 5.719E+08
250 1.0 20 0.004 5.275E+08
250 1.0 25 0.004 5.338E+08
250 1.0 50 0.004 4.614E+08
250 1.0 100 0.004 2.690E+08
b ε k DR IL
500 1.0 3 0.003 8.400E+08
500 1.0 5 0.003 7.750E+08
500 1.0 10 0.002 6.810E+08
500 1.0 15 0.002 5.948E+08
500 1.0 20 0.002 5.520E+08
500 1.0 25 0.002 5.469E+08
500 1.0 50 0.002 4.629E+08
500 1.0 100 0.002 3.610E+08
b ε k DR IL
1000 1.0 3 0.002 8.361E+08
1000 1.0 5 0.001 7.607E+08
1000 1.0 10 0.001 6.796E+08
1000 1.0 15 0.001 6.064E+08
1000 1.0 20 0.001 5.655E+08
1000 1.0 25 0.001 5.345E+08
1000 1.0 50 0.001 4.561E+08
1000 1.0 100 0.001 3.754E+08
Table A.14: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 1.0 with the
Waveform generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 10 3 0.123 1.148E+07
100 10 5 0.075 1.126E+07
100 10 10 0.040 1.103E+07
100 10 15 0.030 1.024E+07
100 10 20 0.023 1.004E+07
100 10 25 0.020 1.005E+07
100 10 50 0.012 8.284E+06
100 10 100 0.011 5.116E+06
b ε k DR IL
250 10 3 0.085 1.127E+07
250 10 5 0.050 1.142E+07
250 10 10 0.027 1.100E+07
250 10 15 0.021 1.033E+07
250 10 20 0.016 9.988E+06
250 10 25 0.013 1.012E+07
250 10 50 0.008 9.526E+06
250 10 100 0.005 7.668E+06
b ε k DR IL
500 10 3 0.062 1.134E+07
500 10 5 0.037 1.151E+07
500 10 10 0.021 1.120E+07
500 10 15 0.016 1.055E+07
500 10 20 0.013 1.023E+07
500 10 25 0.011 1.025E+07
500 10 50 0.007 9.540E+06
500 10 100 0.004 8.585E+06
b ε k DR IL
1000 10 3 0.047 1.130E+07
1000 10 5 0.028 1.136E+07
1000 10 10 0.016 1.119E+07
1000 10 15 0.012 1.067E+07
1000 10 20 0.010 1.036E+07
1000 10 25 0.008 1.012E+07
1000 10 50 0.005 9.472E+06
1000 10 100 0.003 8.725E+06
Table A.15: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 10 with the
Waveform generator.
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b ε k DR IL
100 100 3 0.262 3.053E+06
100 100 5 0.131 3.867E+06
100 100 10 0.059 4.500E+06
100 100 15 0.039 4.709E+06
100 100 20 0.030 4.821E+06
100 100 25 0.024 4.890E+06
100 100 50 0.013 5.003E+06
100 100 100 0.010 5.029E+06
b ε k DR IL
250 100 3 0.221 3.047E+06
250 100 5 0.108 3.867E+06
250 100 10 0.049 4.494E+06
250 100 15 0.032 4.703E+06
250 100 20 0.024 4.807E+06
250 100 25 0.020 4.874E+06
250 100 50 0.011 5.000E+06
250 100 100 0.006 5.049E+06
b ε k DR IL
500 100 3 0.194 3.052E+06
500 100 5 0.096 3.868E+06
500 100 10 0.044 4.498E+06
500 100 15 0.029 4.702E+06
500 100 20 0.022 4.806E+06
500 100 25 0.018 4.873E+06
500 100 50 0.009 4.997E+06
500 100 100 0.005 5.054E+06
b ε k DR IL
1000 100 3 0.178 3.043E+06
1000 100 5 0.090 3.861E+06
1000 100 10 0.042 4.496E+06
1000 100 15 0.028 4.702E+06
1000 100 20 0.021 4.806E+06
1000 100 25 0.017 4.874E+06
1000 100 50 0.008 4.997E+06
1000 100 100 0.005 5.051E+06
Table A.16: Differential privacy filter IL & DR estimations for ε = 100 with the
Waveform generator.
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